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As one 810w11 turna the page. of the history at 
philosopbJ, the names of men ~o made exceptional contribu-
tions to the ph11osophical tllought ot their day an d age stand 
out ln large letters above the small print ot the rest or the 
page. Thes. are the names one is wont to remember; they leave 
an impression on one's mind; they influence man' 8 1nnermost 
thought 1n one wsf or another. 
Two such names, printed in the bold t"e or all the 
history ot philosophy books, easl1.,. imprint themselves in the 
memory of every reader. The one, Plato, is a nama found in 
the very early pages ot every history book. He lived in the 
..... aning-' age or philosophical thinking J he has lett a de-
r in! te mark on the character ot philosophy. He was t,lle 'be-




hitherto impenetrable philosophical realms ot knowledge. As 
the pages ot the history of philosophy are slowly turned, the 
nanes ot countless philosophers, enlightened by this Platonic 
beacon, appear on page atter page. Manr mo~e pages have to be 
turned -- more than eight oenturies had gone by -- bet ore the 
name ot a man tho exalted that tradition to heights unatta1ned 
before his time appears. The man whose influence fts as a 
guide post marking the completely fin1shed co~s. ot the Pla-
tonic tradition was DiOD7sius the ~eopagite. 
Both these men, Plato III d Dion7sius, were interested 
In explain1ng not on17 the things the,. sawall around them:-
selves, but even more than that, the ultimate cause ot all 
things.1 They never rested and we~ never satisfied until 
. . 
their minds rested in an ultimate, 8. unity, that would be the 
keystone of their philosophioal thought. Now both these men 
discovered these ke7Btones and lett in writing their deoisions 
_. what the ke.,stones are, bow they came to the knowledge of 
them, and how they hold together the arch of their particular 
slstema. 
For Plato, the .keystone was the notion ot the Supreme 
1 G. i'h~ry, "Scot Erlgene. Introducteuzt de Dell'1S," The"New 
Scholastlclam, Waahington, Cathblic Ull1verait7 PreS81.-rt1.. 3) 
'01. VI!, g6. Also J\1l1us Stenzel! Plato' a Xethod or m.a:. 
lectic, Clarendon P:reas, oxtord, 1':l4tJ, 6. -
-Good, he bu1lt his system stone by stone until tinall,. he was 
read,. to put into its unique place the tinal stone, the Supreme 
Good.2 This is the tr.a~ent ot Plato's philosophy as found -I 
1n the now monumental lCrk, the R,eebli~. Centuries]a tar, 
Dion'1sius, with a more keenly theological outlook,) completed 
h1 s arch in ,much the san e wa'1. 
ibus he has lett a bluepr11'1t ot the arobi teotural struoture 
ot his philosophy. 4 The import81 ce ot this e1ght century gap 
. 
betw.een the lives ot these two philosophers cannot be min1m1aed, 
tor during that time Chr1stianity was born and grew to sturd,. 
. . 
stature. Tmla D1onys1ue, himself' a Christian: had in Christ-
, 
ian1t1' a system ot ohecks and balances, undre8Jl ed ot 1n the 
age or hia predeceasor. 
Because the influence ot these two men fta aounlque, 
a comparative study ot what each considered the apex at his 
work 1s apropos. Already man,. great philosophers ..... the1r 
number 1s legion -- have made soholarly pronouncements about 
what Plato said and thought. Needless to 881, all are not in 
perfect harmony_ A revi •• ot the h1gh points ot the1r finding., 
1 I 
-mere11 with regard to the runction or the Supreme Good, will 
be the aim ot the first part or this paper. 
To very man,. savant • • t ph1losoPh7, even ~ their 
intel'ests :may have carried them deep into the lab)':rinthine ways 
at philosoph,. f the name or Dlonyalu8 means no mol'O than just 
the name ot another little knDyn ~h11osophel'~' The few facts 
that can be gleaned trom varlou. recent sources about his lite 
cast an oblitel'atlng shadow over the halo that had been placed 
above his head by many ot the people o£ the MlddleAges. How-
ever, what little 1s known ot his 11te is very intere.ting 
and augments conslderabll the lntel'est that has been aroused 
by the few extant works we know are his. These tew scattered 
tacta, theretore, that are known about him wUl be & valuable 
asset to this study ot Dion1sius and a fitting introduction 
to the analysis or his phllo80ph,.. 
After a ve17 brier lntroduction to Dionyslus the man, 
a a,noptie sketch of his theodlcy 1't 11 be·· given wi th especlal 
emphasis placed on "goodness" .a the f iI4St name of God. This 
is not misplaced emphasis because, as shall be seen, the name 
"goodness" to Dlonyslus is the most fundamental or all the 
divine nartl6S. 
Finally, after an analysis of the indiv1dual doc-
trines ot the two men has been given, a comparison wll1 be made 
-between the basic points of theIr works 80 that, it possible, 
the princ1ple of identi t1 can be found in the doctrine of the 
two :men. Th1a w1l1 be of special Intel'est because it wUl lead 
to the olue that prompted EtIennG Gl1son to wrIte: "The God at 
Dlon1s1us, then, resembles the Idea of the Good or whioh Plato 
wrote in his work the ReJ!Ubllc."5 This will lead, then, to 
the discover,. of the point of identity between the two that 
provoked Gilson to write of the marked ldenti t,. in t hell' writ. 
Ings. 
It would be impossible in the limited space of this..( 
study to give a complete, comprehensive analysis ot these two 
. . 
men. Ideally, perhaps, this would be the most plausible wal 
. . 
to establish the identity_ What can be done, however, is to 
establish an identity in a very basic poInt that necessitates 
a similarity in a score of other points. Once this identIty 
1s firmly proved, the other points ot stm1~arity must be there 
because the,. tollow or necessity_ 
Such is the plan ot lttt£ck 01: this paper. The pivotal 
pOint of identity 1'1111 bet the idea of c;oodnass in the works o£ 
• 
F _ .. 
S "t. Dieu de Denrs re~.emble alor~ a l'Idee du Bien decrite 
par Platon dans sa Republlque." Etienne'al1son. La Philo-
'ophie Au Moyen Age, Parot, Paria, 1947, 82. (Urth. li'igllah 
translations In the follOWing pages are the author's own. 
unless otherwise speoified.) 
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the two men. For both these philosophers tho ide.of goodness 
is basic. The locus classicus tor Plato'. treatment 1s Book 
VI ot the Republic; to this section of the ROEub11c as tar 
as is possible,tb1s study w11l be lim1ted. For Dionysius th~ 
treatment 1s not so succinct. However, most of what he says 
can be t ound 1n Chapter IV of the 12.!. 1)1 v1nlp ... }ro .... nl ..... 1 ... ni ......... b...,u .. s. From 
these two limited sections, then, most of the compar1son will 
be made. 
A legitimate retort ot all this 1ntroductory matter 
ot discuss10n comes to m.ind almost immediately. Why all tb1s 
d1scuss1on and weishins ot opinions of two men Who are just so 
many names in the history of ph1losoph1? But both Plato f:lJld 
Dionys1us are much more tll8l1 just nam.es in a h1stoIT book' 
It must not be t'orgot.ten that Plato st .. ted a tradition that 
has not d1ed even to th1 s da7 m d hu inspired the minds of 
great men from his own t1me to the present. Plato may have 
passed away; to ll'18.D7 he may be just another naae in a history 
book. But Plato started a ball rolling, and because ot the 
impetus he gave it, it 1s still rol11ng at the present time. 
low the tradit10n thai nato started was oarried on 
tor manr yoars unt1l t1Jaa brought 1 t a pertect10n that was 
undreamed ot by Plato. This perfection of Platonic ph1losopb7 
--
7 
_s due to an amalgam ot Platonic philosophy "- th a Christ1an 
theology. Quite evidently. this was not a perfect amalgam, 
nor did it answer all the difficu1tles that an,. such amalgama-
tion would entall. But at lea.st it was attempted. The success 
of the enterprise ls still &matter ot dispute among grea.t 
thinkers. True, it was the result of many years or development 
and the work o£ many philosoph'e;x's, allot.' whom pla:1ed their 
parts in its development. The work of a~ost all thBse philo-
sophers, called Neoplaton1sts today, influenced in v&171ng 
degrees this flnal amalgamation. 
Such an amalgam took place both 1n the Latin and in 
the Greek tradition. The fo~er was due chiefly to the gentus 
of Saint Augustine; hi' influence in clarifying the theology 
of the Catholio Cbureb and of inspiring others 1s well known. 
Among the Greek Fathers the tradition 1s not 80 well known ... 
the Latin tradition. By tar the most important factor that 
influenced & Platonic tradition on the intelleotual heritage 
of the Latin Middle Ages, was the corpus Qr Dionysian writ-
ings. Because this influence was from a Greek school, 1 twas 
not as pronounoed as the Latin influence. However, 1n the 
11ght of the detaIled recent research, it. importance 1s be-
oOming more and more evldent.6 
-
6 Raym-:>nd nlbanslq" 'rhe continu1t~ ot the Platonic TradItion, 
The Warburs Institute, '£Onden, r)1J; z-: .. 
F 
a 
Agatn, that this influence was of Platonic heritage 
is of importance. Otten, because or the brilliant glow ot 
Aristoteliam8m, the tlashing brilliance ot the Platonic lum-
inaries is lost sight ot. Yet, even the genius ot Saint Thomas 
saw the importance ot the Platonic teachings. 
The two chief eXpOflents ot the Latta and at 
the Greek Cbr1atian branches ot the indi-
rect tra.d1 tion, Augustine and Den'18 the Aero-
pagi te, combine trom the nlnth eenttu.'7' to 
torm, U it were, an element which may be " 
termed th& Christian transformation of Nee-
platan1~, the eftect ot which 18 telt 
throughout; the I.!iddle Ages and \1hich even in 
Saint Thomas 18 powertu.l enough to limit and 
counterbalance 1n a VIEW' ~is strict f..rlstotel-
lam_.1 
How when one considers to wbat extent Salnt Thomas 
was able to carry the philosoPhical notions or Aristotle 1n hi. 
analysis at Christlan theology, one i. inclined to tb1nk that 
Saint Thomas' solution to the problem is the only pe:rtect solu-
tion. This mayor ... ,. not be true f' ~e point that l1I1st be 
remembered is this. The reason why the great minds ot the 
Middle Age. were able to get as taP along the road ot tl-Uth .. 
th&7 did was that the,. took up wbare the earlier philosophers 
had lett ott. It the earlier th1nkers had alread'y sta:rbed ott 
'. 
on a completel,. wrong road, even the gl"eat*3st minds w~uld. have 
• d II! 
7 ~., 21. 
9 
bad great difficulty to bring themselves to end on the right 
road. The,. might even have found this imposs1ble. Medieval 
. 
thought succeeded in bringing the earlier thought, especially 
the thought of the Greeks, to its point of perract10n mainly 
because the earlier thought W8.3 alread7 1n many ronpects true.8 
. 
Christian thinkers took up theso t :ru.ths, and vi th tho aid of: 
Christian revelation, opened up new vistae and pointed to new 
horizons that the earlier thinkers never thought ot. Christian 
thin1e rB progressed as rapidly as they d1d only because ot 
. this earlier groundwork. "VJhen they raised the problem of the 
origin of being, Plato and Aristotle wer~ on the right road. 
and it 1s prec1sely b eCQU8e they Vi ere on the right road that 
to go further along was progress."9 
It was just suoh a task that Dlonyslu. took upon h1Ju.,. 
. 
• elf. With a completel,. Platonic "background, Dion7s1ua made 
USe ot that baokground in a completel,. Chr1stian theological 
ml11eu.10 DlanJS1u8 had taken the pagan notions ot Plato uh1ch 
had been mod1.r1ed to a great extent by the Weoplatonists and 
lifted them out ot the1x- laval ot TIellel11am into tho healthy 




completely in his endeavo~s 1s open to quest1on, his oryptlcal 
phraseology lends 1tself to various Inte~pratations.l1 That 
Dlonysius ll1ade such an attempt 1s laudable and becauso this 
attempt was, as we now know, or lInporta.nce, it is worthy 0'£ 
a comparative analysis. 
-
U Ibid., 94. 
L 
CHAPTER II 
THE S U'.PREJ\~E GOOD AS F otllm Dl 
PLATO'S REPUBLIC 
J 
The first loOk into the books, pamphlets, and articles 
wi tten to explain the bas 1e notions of the philosophy ot Plato, 
makes one conclude that thE" plethora ot material 18 aeemingl,. 
overwhelming. only after a careful 'anal,.tic study i8 it evident 
that all the matter groups 1 tIel! around a few central ideas. 
Oval" theae ideas commentators take a pro or 8. con position. 
Once these bas1c notions and central 1deas are understood quite 
well, the baokbone ot Platonism &~C the structure of Plato'. 
work are evident. 
'"-
One suoh bfi810 notion is the ide. of the good U found 




of the Republicl and the most extensive aspect of Plato's theo~ 
ot ideas,2 there can be no doubt. Whether or not Plato changes 
his tdeas in his later dialogues does not effect this study. 
The primart interest of this analysis is going to be oentered 
on this doctl"lne of the good as found tn the Repub,.lli. Th:ts 
dialogue, philosophers agree, presents an excellent conspectus 
ot the e&r17 stages ot Plato1s entire phtlonophical S7steM.3 
It is in t..1)is dialogue that the;· doctrine of the good., \1I'hlc..'l 
. 
rounded off Plato's own sch0r:10 ot p;ltlosophy, was first ('X-
pounded. It is this doctrine that has inspired philosophers 
since tho day it first met the <lager ears of ;Plato's fo110w81"s. 
A brief summary of the pas sage in wh1 eh the idea of 
the good is expla1ned in the R6PublJ..~4 .11 make Plato. s ideas 
of the good more intelligible. Socrates, the mouthpiece of 
Plato in this dialogue) is explaining his ideas to a few fol-
lowers. He asks his listeners what the gres.test study 1s and 
what stUdy moet properly be longs to the gue.rdlan or the stat e • 
• 'T t I J • u " • # 
1 A.E. TA,.lor. ~ '!atg, l.a!.!en s! ~~s Work., Methuen and Co., 
London, 19~, a~. . * 
2 Jul1us·Stenael,...,Ela.to t s Method of D!aleotlct Olarendon Press, Oxtord, 11940 ij,£; . '.' , · - ,- . I.' T ~ • • 
3 Paul More •. ~ton1"f Princeton Press. Princeton, 1926, 312. 
4 Plato; fuU!L,'~ , >~ t. All quota.tions 1'1111 be taken r rom. 
Plato, tSe n~~11C, transl. by raul Shorey; ad. by tho Loeb ~assieULISrar1 •. Itarvard University Press, Cambridge, 1935. 
Whenever nee.seary, the Greek text will be adde4. 
13 
The answer he gives is the study ot the idea ot the good. This 
is clearly dist1ngu1shed tram the study of mere pleasure and 
trom mere intellectual knowledge. On this one point, the nature 
ot the Sup~maGood, Socrates tells his listeners that most men 
are almost completely in the dark. This ultimate good is the 
one thing that the guardian ot the state should how the most 
about. 
Socrates baa now succeeded 1n gett1ng his listeners 
attentive. Their ears prick up; what 18 this good Socrates 1. 
talking about? For the moment, the most that Soeratescan do 
i8 explain the conception ot the good by an analog.,.. The com-
parison 1s very simple, The Supreme Good is to the intelligible 
order what the sun 18 1n the visible world. Two main points or 
comparison are made. First, ~st as the sun 1s the source ot 
vis10n 1n the eye and ot vis1bility in the thing seen, so the 
Supreme Good 1s both the source ot intelligence in the mind and 
intelligibility in the thing understood. Secondly, as the sun 
1s the source ot actual generation and ot growth ot the organic 
world, so the Supreme Good radiates truth and knowledge, and 1. 
actuall.,. the .ouree ot lite and being in the "o1'ld.5 
5 lettleship, 236. 
In like manner, then, lou are to 
sal that the objects ot knowledge not onll 
recai ve t rom the presence ot the good their 
being known, but their verl existence and 
essence 1s derived trom it to them, though 
the good itself is not essence but still 
transcends6essence in dignitl and surpass-ing power. // 
It i8 well to remember that what concerns t his stud" 
mostot all 1s the point of comparison and not whether the theor" 
at light and vision ot Plato as he conceived it was accurate or 
not. What should be particularly noted is the length to whioh 
Plato goes at this point ot the dialogue to make the comparison 
~etween the Supreme Good in the order ot intellisibllity and the 
sun in the order of ne re sense. 
Once Plato haa descr1bed both the position and tunctiom 
of the Supreme Good aa he see it, be goes on to explaln the steps 
through which the human mind passes tram the lowest scale, which 
is complete ignorance ot the Supreme Good, to the swmmit ot the 
perfectlon ot intellIgence, which is the complete knowledge ot 
the Supreme Good. Once agm. n he compares hIs position to the 
degree of light that can illumine an object ot sight, from com-
plete darkness to the luminous brillianoe of noonday sunlight. 
This he represents to his listeners by a very obvious scale 01" 
.ental states which he tries to balance completely and perfoctly 
6 .H.epUbllc, 509B. 
-L 
with the scales ot objects ot thought. He sa18: ~nep~esent them 
then, as it were, by a line divided into two unequal sections and 
, 
cut each section again into the same ratio (the section, that ls, 
ot the visible and that ot the intelligible order }.tf17 The toU%' 
stages are represented by the divided line, and. as he goes on 
:> , 
The ti~8t stage i. mere conjecture - &tl(cfL(i"(..c:(,. It 
represents a state ot mind, the objects ot which are mere images-
I in contrast to the second stage -IT,,6",,-s -- in which the mind has 
a deeper reeling ot certitude about the actual tangible things 
around it. Plato explains his meening clear17: 
Dr tmages I mean, first, shadows and 
then reflections in water and on surfaces of' 
dense, smooth, and' bright textuz.e, md every. 
thing ot that kind, it you apprehend ••• As the 
second seotion assume that ot'which this is a 
likeness or an image, this is, the animals about 
us and all Peants and the w bole class of obJeots 
made by man.· 
. . 
To these two stages or the workings ot the mind, then, are attri-
buted quite a number or separate and apparently independent ob-
jects, each or which has a purpose and position all its own in 
the sensible world. These two states correspond to what would 
be called, in scholastic terminolog7, the world ot partioulars, 





The division more difficult to understand, and whlch 
is 01' more interest to this study, 1s the second and upper divi-
sion 01' the divided line. This division consists 01' two parts; 
There 18 one section or it which the soul is 
oa.,pelled to investige br treat1Dg as images 
the things Wtated in the tomer division 
and by means at usumptlona trom which 1t 
proceeds not up to a first principle but 
down to a conclusion, while there i8 another 
section in which it advances trom i t8 assump-
tions, and in whlcb 1t makes no us. of the 
images employed by tbe other section, rel.,.-
ing on ideas only 8Qd progressing systematic-
ally through ideas. 'I 
The distinction between theseturo stages is this. The tormer 
.. ' 
.tage, 1,,:'vOLt4. • depends upon various prlnciples, laws, theorems, 
. . 
and' axioms, a 11 called "bJpotheses," b'1 which t he nature ot the 
, ~ 
" , particulars known tromthe two tormer- stages,e t .l<:""(1"L,,and 7Tttr"St 
are better known. The tinal and highest stage of knowledge, 
~ 
, vo,..,,.,s, is a perfect state 01' intelligence which would use the 
postulates at J,1vo,~as mere starting points snd go on to the 
. . 
d1scovery or more ultimate premises, or tinally, to the real 
"pr-1nciple ot eve~h1ng." once this tinal principle had been 
deduced by this process ot building up to 1 t, the "way up" 01' 





down" oi'i:lhe earlier philosophers, a1:';' tho consoquences that VJoul( 
. 
fo110\,,1 from. such a first pI'inciple, which vlould be deduced. No 
appeal woulli be made to t;he sensible world, manifestod in the 
fOI"mer s"l'ailges. Use would be m.ade only ot "pure ideas, moving on 
th:,,"ouGh ideas and ending w.i. th ideas.-10 The object, then, ot 
this highest stage of knowledge is the Supreme GoodJ to this 
supreDe Good all things are related. In this does the highest 
stage ditter from the lower in which all things are related to 
assumed h1Potheses.11 In the final stage there is a definite 
unity, the unit1 brought by the superiority or the Supreme Good. 
As a unity. the Supreme Good rises above the mere hypotheses ot 
the r ormar stage of knowledge and resut ts in t he pretect know-
ledge ot all things tor the human mlnd.12 
Plato goes on to relate the famouB "Allegory of the 
Cave," in whioh he shows the position ot the human race in regard 
to the stages or the d1vided 11ne, the staees ot knowledge. The 
allegory i8 important because ot its real relation to the d1vid-
ed line discussed above. In the allegory 
the prisoner set tree trom the cave and 
gradually acoustomed to bear the strongest 
light passes through a series at stages 
10 5110 •. 
U Taylor, 291-292_ 
12 Wattleship, 258. 
which correspond generall,. to toot which 
W.QS s,mbollzed by the d1 vided l1ne_1n the 
preced1ng section or the argument.lJ 
18 
The t1nal ucent trom the oave 1s a tl.ll'1l1ng to the s un as it 1s 
"1n and 01 itself 1n its own place. ft14 Once aga1n Plato has 
compared the vision of the sun 1n t he sensible order to the 
knowledge ot the Supreme Good in the intelligible order. For the 
~i8oner released from the cave, the tinal ascent is to attain to 
the knowledge of the Supreme Good. 
But. at any rate, 1lf1 dream as it appears to 
me 18 that in the region of the known the last 
thing to be seen' and hardl,. to be seem is the 
idea or the good, and that when seen it must 
needs pOint us to the oonclusion that th1. 1s 
indeed the caUSe ot- all things, of all that 1s 
right and beaut1tul, giving birth in the visible 
world to light, and t he author oE light and 1t-
selt 1n the intelligible world"be1ng the authe~ 
t1c source ot t ruth and reason, a net that all'1One 
who is to act w1se17 1n pr1vate_gr in publio 
must have oaught sight ot th1s.J.!1 
iOnly a very rew, tmd these VI lth V617 muoh effort and struggle, 
lever rise to the vision ot the s un and the contemplation of the 
iSupreme Good. 
Such 1s the sohematic outline ot Plato's treatment ot 
the good. '1'0 understand 1 ts relatl ve posl tlon in the soale ot 
~o.ledge, 1 t 1s necesaaz-J to II tudy a little more closely the 
19 
importance of the Supreme Good in Plato's philosophlcal scheme • 
• The first important tact that arllOne who reads the R~Rublic, 
notioes 1s the predominance ot the Supreme Good by Plato. Why 
the Supreme Good should be the object ot the h1ghest stage or 
knowledge arouses onets curiosity. A cause ot wender, too, is 
how Plato gets into suoh a position ph1losophically as to have 
to draw suoh a conclusion. The nature ot the Supreme Good and 
tts relation to &17 the other caUBes is also or interest to.any-
one lIho wishes to understand Plato. Each ot these problems, 
therefore, mu.st be taken up individuall)" if further understanding 
is expected. 
It is not a mere matter ot choiee that leads Plato 
~nto assigning the primacy at his philosophical scheme toUle 
~upreme Good. Quite the contrary' Plato's line ot reasoning 
1a this. The man who baa attained real "wisdOlltt would see that 
the reason why anything Is, and the reason why it Is what it ls, 
would be 80me cause. Now in the entire ReEubllc Plato is Inter~/ 
~8ted in finding the ul tim.ate cause or man's actions. What is 
it that should stimulate the best man, the philosopher, as an 
~'t PlatO'1I conclusion is that the food 1s the desired aim of 
~l men's actlons.l6 Nor does plato limit this teleological 
~oncept to the actions ot m.en. The very same idea he applies 
16 505s. 
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more un! ver.al11 not only to the aotlonIJ or men but to the ve1!f 
nature of th1ngs, to all beings,Ethical actlon. then, ftS the 
.fUse that 8et off thia explosive ide,," ln the philosophy or Plato. 
Th18 basl0, teleological oonceptlon of ethioal actlon 18 t~€} main 
theme or the 11&190112.17 'fbla 1dea enables nato to explain why 
all thins. -- not only the actlone ot lion but alao the very tan-
gible things that 110 all around us l.n this universe - 8tr11'o 
tor an end. All things, there.toN, tor Plato strive for an endJ 
all thinss have Ita longing (i(pws) to maintatn thoml!lelve4 1n 
their proper ttomt (Z Go~).·16 
If the good 18 tho cnuse or mant s actions, Plato 
argues, 1t must be the ultimate cause ot all th1nsa, tJaterial and 
1mmaterial as 11011,19 Plato never says that all thing. aro at 
all conaclou$ of the Supreme Good: he nlel·aly aaya that Elll thing. 
are so made 8.8 ultimatel,. to bo expla1ned and to 000 in the hlbb-
- 1. -l\- f-l-e.t good. This toleoloclcal approacb as a pons ble solution to 
tho ;Pl'oblem of boing was the :reault of a long series ot' devolop-
menta in Plato's phIlosophy, it was an ld,ea that goes bac!! a!ld 




This basic notion/~f a teleological principle is V8r-r 
i;!1portant tor an understanding or Plat o's viewpoint. To under-
stand why he made the Supreme Good so important in his philosoph,. 
~s to understand that plato had tou~ the unity b,. m lch he could 
fe~ryla1n not oftly the immanent nature ot things b\'~.t ~.lpo the unity 
that would make a thing knowable. For a long time he had been 
~ooking tor just ~ a unitYJ hi. earlier dialogues are all avid-
fence ot t his fact. 1to1f 1n the ft~l!!blic such a un! t7 is finally. 
discovered and applied to his au~.m •• yatem ot philosoph,.. T.b&t 
~i tl he h{ld been looking tor, he t1nally found in the idea ot 
~he Supreme Good.21 This idea answered and solved many or the 
~irtlcultles he was not able to answer in his earlier dialogues. 
~ut unknown to Plato at the time of h1s writing of the l1eebl1o, 
. Ithis solution was to bring" th it many new difficulties that 
.. ere equall,. instrumental. in »*king na·to revise hie ,osition in 
~ater dialogues, However, his solution did,. at least fel' the 
~ment,. solve hi. major d1fficult1es. 
At the mOl.'lent it i8 diff1cult to aee what oonnect1on 
ther~ is in the mind ot Plato between t he Supreme Good" 'ttl ioh 
tor the present at least, seems to be someth1ng outs1de the thing 
itself',. and:the good which i8 immanent in ttbe thing i teal!. For 
21 Stenzel, 42. 
22 
Plato the bridge that links the gap between the world of real 
beings and the wo:t~ld of intellig1ble beings 1s a bJtldgo sus .. 
pended on thln, trasile, silk tibers. It seems to snap just as 
soon as anyone puts even a little pressure at analysis to it. 
What Plato seems to say 1. s thi,!'J. All t~11ngs in the 
world of phenomena around us si:)ri va tor a good. The reason for 
this must be, quito evidently. that they all participate in some 
single archet:n>e, which by the very nature of t he case must be 
the Supreme Good. Since all things strive for the Good cmd par-
ticipate in the good, their very being muct be exp1a:tned by th~ 
good. Furthermore, as the source ot all good, this final end 
and atm of all things must be the Supreme Good, distinct from 
all other things. But all things strive for the good, each in 
its own particular way. The philosopher comprehends this by 
a process ot: reasoning, the higbest stage ot human intelligence. 
This prooess leads him to the knowledge ot the go04 of all 
things. Consequently, the Supreme Good is the oause ot the being 
ot all things, and over and above tr~t, the caUSe of their in-
telligibi11ty as well.22 It 1s. therefore, from. the idea of the 
good that all reasoning about causes must atart.23 
At this point it 1s not too difficult to see What, 
.. 
• "' • p 
, ----------------------------------------~ L 
txeora all indtcations unknown to Plato, cauaed him 80 much d1t-
t1cultr. Modern critics, with all the writings at Plato betore 
# 
thaa, oan read117 sa1 that Plato did not d1st1ngu1Sh oarefully 
. . 
betnen the real and the ideal ord~ and, u a result, can sa,. 
that he ran into trouble 1n explaining .atisfactoril7 the prin-
oipl •• of oausa11tT. Quit. obviousl,., J1.ato waa contusing the 
go04 u the object at atrlv1ng and that in the good 1b 1& 18 the 
source at 1ntoll1g1blllt'1. Suoh actuall,. waG t he case, and rot' 
tha t reuon, the Suprerao Oood pla.,-ed such a ve1:7' 1mportant role 
1n the ~02!b.l~h 
Barlter 121 this paper wben an explanation was given I 
or the tataOua 41v1ded line of Plato, the intimate connection r! 'I..: 
, 
ibetween the ob Jecta ot knowledge and the correspondtns stages of 
knowledge that go along a1de thea was cl.ar178 een. Even thoUlh'"'! 
tL/ 
it 18 hard to t lnd the cl .... cut distinction bet"ell the real 
order and the lntell1g1ble order 1n the plan ot Plato, at111 1t 
1a clear that tor Plato 1t 1s through thtl good that all tb1.ns-
Ire to be known. Until the eooc! 1.8 known, the tNe nat'l..lnl or 
. 
things 1s not rtf-all,. knoW'llt or at 18 nst the true nat"ure 1a not 
Pmc)WJl .• in 1ta entl:ret'1 and In ita r-elatlonah1p w1th other' th1ng.h 
~7 an 1uge or a conjecture 1s had at 1 t. Until th1llga are 
• 
The ultimate nature ot th18 SUpreme aood shall be seen 
la.ter. Par the px-8a8nt 1 t 1s enough to 8a'1 tbat in" language 
. 
of Plato, the Supreme Good DNSt be kno1m. tlret and t01'emoat. ':, 
!he wwd ·8004" means that which an',7'thlng 
18 meant to do or to bo. Tho u.se ot t he word 
imp11 •• a certain ultimate bypothea18 as to 
the nattlX'o of tb1nsa,_ name17 that thol'e 111 
reason operating 1n the worldt lnWlln, and 111 Dature, th18 reaaon ahoft taelt e"17-
where 1n the world 1n th18 partioular -7, 
that llboneyer there are a n\Db<u.lt or elemtmts 
co-ext.tent, tb&re w111 be round a C$;rta:S.n 
un1 t7, there 18 a eertaln pxt1nclple which 
oo:-r.~ate. thea, t broush "hleh alone ther 
are what they are, a:ad 11& the l1ibt of 1h loh 
they oan bo UDderatood.ZIf. 
Such an lnterpretatlon 18 the log1cal explanat10n ot 
what Plato meana when he aa,... "7!h6 ob "aota or knowl8dge not 01"41' 
receive trom the presenoe or the £;ood their being known, but the,. 
receive the1r vel"7 existence and essence wbleh are derived to 
them tram 1t. tt25 From 8uch a atatement the paralle11em bet.en 
l~tot a teleolog7 and the knoudge of a thingt s e8senoe 18 ve'rJ' } . 
evident. 
One thing more 1n this conneot lon must be mentioned 
because it throw. more lIght on th1. Platonic doctrine. It is 
thi8" The primo importance or the teleologIcal not! on or Plato •• 
interpretation when applied to man .bows the vIJr'1 intimate link 
- I IU • • ... II •• I. r 
2> 
111 the mind of Plato bet.en what pb11080pbera oall moral 1 ty and 
knowledge. 'rbe ideal for :* n can be expla1ned as "pel'tfect know-
edse and understanding or himsell and ot hi. 11re, or as per-
act ~r.rormance or hi. true 1" unction in 111.8 world of wbioh be 
1. a part_n26 Str1ctly apeak1nt, and 1n the l1t;ht ot what are 
ona14.re4 common moral acts, Plato 1. not involved 1nmoral 
qualitiea at all. tIIen aira at an "object of deslre -- that 1b 10h 
. 
o moat want. tt27 !he good lite alma 8 t the worth7 end, the per-
action or ita being_ This 18 ita good, b7 this Plato mean a 
virtue (!t.p£n;) - that with wb1ch .omoth1~ 18 mad. good w1th1n 
ita own epeci ••• 
The unity, then, that b1nda together intelligence and ! 
the intelligible 18 the good. It 18 the lingle archetype b7 
1b lob the mind com.. to lnlOW the ob jeeta ot knowlodge and b7 
which the •• object. rece1.e their very exi.tanee and easenc •• 
fh. quest10n that 10&108117 rollon th ••• statements 1. thlfh 
What 1. rea117 the natw.-. of the good tbat nato thue conce1ved 
to pertona thts function? In the light or nato" limited tHat-
m.ent th1s que. tion "ball now be treated. 
'0 ••• all thing. and to Stud7 them 1n the light ot 
• rt t I II AI " t , 11. 
the GOod it the function of the fOUI'th and lut .tage or 1i:now-
lodee. Such 1s tho task of the true philosopher, Plato m.ainta1ne. 
When nato says that the o~jocts ot knowledge not onl,. receive 
from t he presence or the good theil' be1ng lmown .a well as t beitt 
essence and e x1atence, he adds one more notch n. at'firms be-
side.: "The g oed ltGelt 18 not essence, but still tx-anaoenc18 
··e esa.nee in dle;nlt7 .. IUl'pu81ns pow:-.8.. But Gven bo.fore M 
".a thta atat.ent he u.e1"tat 
. 
Thl. reallt,., then, that glves theIr tl'U. tb 
to tho obJ.o~. of knowledge and the power 
of knO'l'1..nS t:o tho ~. 'IOU _at ... ,. 1. 
the 14 •• or the (;004 (lSt.'V- r.u ;')';.6>011 ) 
$n4 lOU ..... t oODCel ve 1 t .a bainG tho cauae 
ot lm.owle4;e (<<~r:", .... J'l1Ti~';4J1S ).4 of 
truth 1n 80 tu .a lmown.~ 
• tar Plato the ldeaot the good 1. the ult1ute .oure. ot all 
the ~p X ~ ot the mo_bill t7 or thing. and ot their ".17 
Dvm thOUGh nato mainta1ne th1a partlaula r function 
t the good. namel)" tbat 1 t 18 the {I outtce ot both the obJeot. 
f knowledge and tlwlr lmoWablUt:r, atlll the exact nature of 
a principle 1s .ltl"lve wbenevwnato mentlona 1t. nato 
eematoto on a tenoe When he triea to esplain the .xact natw:-e 
. . 





let us tL~r:J3S fOT the t:t1"r'e bl'ling the nature of the good 'n it-
self; for it s(;ems that to attain to my prosent SUrMtSf": of that 
i0 a pitch above tho impulse that wings my flight today.")O 
Th.en again he sf11 S 1n so ~.ny words that the idea of the (:001 is 
a s'.tr1l1is e, and vb ether I a.:n right or not, God on!.'; kno1!;"S. "31 
Later on he ln~lsta that t he idea ot the good is "very hard to 
believe -- yet tram another point of view is harder still to 
deny. "32 Just how the Supreme Good is the s ouree of or the cause 
of being, whether it is a creative cause or not, how it exerts 
its causality on being -- these are que.tiona that Plato does 
not answer in hiD treatment or the Supreme Good in the Republic. 
But they are problems that readers of the Republic have been 
asking tor centuries. 
The reality or thegood is hard to deny because, as 
has been seen, Plato himself says that the good is not the same 
as being, but even beyond baing and surpa88i~~ it in dignity and 
power. Such an explanation is t he clue to the "transoendent" 
natul'tl of the good • .3) The good is a totality. an absolute plen-
tltude. It is something more than being, it is a reality that 




33 Taylor, 286. 
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Uttu!1oC than bol~.34. 'rills notion of the tlbejondnoss ff and "tral'l8-
endenoe" ot the Good ia very fundamental to Platots ph1losophy 
8 seen in the !te..2:b:J.l~. The metaphysioal con •• quences ot such a 
onclusion will be studied more thorouGhly 1n the tinal chapter 
~ "'transcendent" nat.ure ot tbi. unique_metaphysical 
r1nclple and 1te power to unlty all reality baa been a source 
eontroveray 81nc. it tlrat Baw the llght ot cttY. 1'h8 contro-
era,. can be .p1 tomtaad in a que.tloft thus. Does th, good 1Ih lob 
tranaconda all being, even the being 1n the w<rId or 1<1eu J this 
rtectlon which unite. all thing. in a perfeotion. really exist 
ut.ide the mind whieh concelvea lt as tho ond of' all thlngs1 
o answer this quest10n many more quest10na would have to be 
IW61'ted betore it. Beoaua. ot the intimate,real relation be-
good and. the PlatonIc ideas, which." the obJeots ot 
11'1 the third stage of the d.ivided. line, the SL;'VOL4 , 
a bIt hes1tant to oome to any conclu.sions. 
ere 1s to La round no very olear and preciee explanation tram 
lato in Which ho rnakttl!l definite k'14t1nctlon between the 1deas 
Supl"eme Q'oo<1. lIe does make .. distinction, hoftver ob-
••• by the other section or the tntel-
Ug1ble I mean that whioh the reason 1tselt 
l.,.a hold ot by the power ot dl.loctlo., 
treating it. assuaptlone not as absolute 
beginnings but llterall,. as hypotheses, 
underpinnings, tootinrs, and springboards 
DO to apeak, to enable it to rise to trAt 
wblch requires no aa:.nllaptlon tlnd 18 the 
starting point 01" all, and alto%' attaining 
to that! again taking hOld or the first de-
pendeno os tl'Om it, 80 toproceod dO'Wnwax-d 
to the conaluslon&, maktng no use whatever 
ot ani Obj60t at: senae but only 01* pure ideas 
m.ovl%~ Oll tl:wou.gh 1deal to ideu and endlnr; 
w1th 1deas.» 
Bow whetlutr tb1a staMina point to which all other 
thinss r1ae 1s aomething radlcalll dltt6Nnt from the lde.s them-
•• 1 ve., or whether 1 t 1s just so.m.e supreme ide. rising above the 
others in that it 18 the first 1de. 1n tne 10g1ea1 order tram 
which all others tlo .. ,ls not immediately clear from the text 
of Plato. The firat princ1ple to Whioh all other 1de •• 1"1.8 1. 
the 1dea ot the goodJ or thla thore ia 11 ttle doubt. Connenta-
tors, YIOrk1ng tNa this text of Plato, argue well that what 1. 
sa1d ot the goodwlll i.i..,~ i,.ot,o be true 01' all the other ideaa 
or hypotheses which Plato makel 80 :much 01'. It it should be 
proved tha.t the good 1s ltaelt a lelt-subsisting torm, a reality 
lubatantlall,. dist1nct trom. the tv,;;\st or reallty, than, it would 
.eem that the same would have to ba said at all the Qtb(~t- 1df.tf.l8_-t 
Here Qno can :recall wbat was 8ald previousl.,. about tbe evident 
shortcomtna of the Platonic .,.atem, namel,. tha t no verT olear 
30 
distinction was ever made between the objects of knowledge and 
the knowledge of objects. As a result ot this contusion Platon-
ism lends itself to the interpretation that the ideas are real, 
subsistant beings. On the other hand, it 1s equally plausible 
in the light of the textual interpretation ot Plato to say that 
the ,Supreme Good of Plato held merely a logical supremacy in the 
rea~ ot ideas while the real subsistence and existence of the 
supreme Good was an idea never intended by Plato. 
No att~:mpt will be made in this inquiry to prove or 
to disprove the conclusions of commentators on this question. 
Arguments equally as strong for both sides can be formulated 
tor the problem. But in spite of the apparent dIfficulty, many 
of the unique qualities of the Supreme Good were able to be 
pointed out. Nothing seen so far in this study excludes the 
possibility of the real existence of the Supreme Good, oven 
though Plato himself may never have drawn that conclusion for 
himself, No real contradictory notions have been round that 
would make it impossible tor such a Supreme Good to exist as a 
real being outside the mind that conceivos it. Perhaps other 
philosophers would come along: in t he years and the c entur1es 
atter Plato, and by making use of all his original and novel 
ideas, prove the r'eal existence of such a beinE. But t h1s 1s 
t 
-+ .. 
matter for another chapter of thls thesis. Summarily, the studj 
of Plato has led to a oasle notion of the Supreme Good as a 
31 
unique, meta.physical principle which is the source of being tor 
all things, both the objects of knowledge and of the knowledge 
of objects itself -- even though in Plato's explanation thereis 
not a cler and evident distinction between t he two _. and which 
itself' transcends all being but yet includes the tot~.11 ty of all 
b e1nt;. 
CHAPTER III 
DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE. THE -GOOD GOD" 
AS PRESENTED IN THE B! DIVINIS NOMINIBY§ 
Slowly the many pages ot the history ot philosophy 
tilled with tbe inspiring story of the genius, Plato, have been 
turned over. Many more pages have to be thumbed before the 
chapter of history headed with the name "Dionysiu8 the Areopag-
ite" appears. Though the story ot his life 1s brietly told, 
still his influence in the philosophical and theological thou&~t 
of the Middle Ages was greater than is commonly realized. 
An interesting and yet decidedly confusing detail 
about the life of the authorj Dlonysius, has pl"ovoked wide-
spread speculation. From internal evidence, as far as is known. 
the Cprpu! Areopasltum -- as the works ot Dlonyslua are now 
alled -- was composed at the end of the fifth C611tury or' at the 
32 
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beginning of the sixth oentury.l All authorities agree unanl-
~ous17 on this point. And yet this fact manlfestly contradiots 
the statements that the Author himself makes about his life. He 
seems, for instance, to SA1 that he was present at the i'uneral 
services of the Blessed Virgin Mar7, and that at the bUl'lal he 
had talked with the Apostles James and Peter.2 Besides 'this,. he 
1 1. Godet, "Denys l.Ar~opaglte," Dictlonnalre de Th~oloele 
C.th:0ll~,e" ed_,:by A. Vacant and" r. 'Mapgeno'E,-':1Dralre 
t.~ousey at Ana, PariS, 1933, 4, col. 431. 
2 D1on,-slus the Areopagite, De Dlv1n1'''llominlbUs~ tl'-ans1. b,. 
Balthasar Corderius, ad. by P. IIgne, pa~{s,·! 51, II! 2. 
Both the Latin and the Greek, when t he author thinks t is 
necessary rO:t~ a better underntanding o£ the text, will be 
taken from the Jl!lgne edition. Some just1tlcatlon should be 
gi van for t he use of the Latin rathol:' thanthe Greek.; the 
original language ot Dionysius. In the first place, the 
remote interest ot this paper in the author, D1onysius, lies 
in the tact at his influence in the west. This intluence 
was through a Latin medium rather than through the Greek 
text. We are ooptain of this because ot the great popular-
ity of the ma.ny cOlnmentaries on his works &luong the Latins. 
Secondly, from all extant historical accounts on the point, 
Dionysius' principle int'luence seems to be in t he West rather 
than in the East. "Pa8udo-Dionysius the Areopagite can be 
included among the ear1,- Western masters by reason of the 
wide circulation of his writings and t heir influence upon 
the Latin world ••• He thus became a western by adoption." 
Hauriee de Wulf, Histor~ ot Mediaeval Phl1osoRhZ, Longmans, 
Green aDd Co., Lonaon, 9~1 lbl. "Thei werG popularised 
b1 the Latin versions of Hi duin and Scotus F~rigena in the 
ninth centur1. ~ld had a oonsiderable influenc~ in the 
Middle Ages, which put them in t he forefront of the Apos-
tolic writ1ngs." Cayre, 91. Therefore, it can be said that 
it was the Latin rather than the Greek text of Dionysius 
tha.t made hi:::. a philosopher and a theologian of'- ~T~''''A. __ 
~'N'S 0 \''\I/>~~ 




protesses to be Saint Paults Athenian convert, Dionysiu8 the Areo-
paglte. 
The Mediaevals, from all appearances, accepted the 
statements and allusions ot Dlonyslus at their fece value, Ilnd 
~orthe most part, were unaware of the anachron1.s:ms. Only later 
IBhrewd scholarship bega.n to see the d.iscropancy between the ex-
~lic1t atatements ot the author and t~e actual historical facts 
ot his 11fe. The considerable weight of such &nnchronians on 
rixing the t!me for the writings of the warlee has led to tho sub-
"equant name of Dlon'181u9, the author of the 'IN orks, a.s the "pseu-
do-Dlonyslus" or the "pseudo-Areopaglte." Often he is listed 
LUlder t he name of "Denys," the French form of Dlonysius, and is 
~bu8 contused with the apostle and tirst bishop of Parls, Sa1nt 
penys the Martyr. 
Great scholars have been trying for a lone time to 
solve the mystery of pseudo-Dionysius. Their attempts do not 
.eem to have been very successful.J From internal evidence 
~uthori ties all agree that t he author ot the Cor"eus Dl".lSt have 
1 ved at tr~ end of the r Ittb century 01" at tho ber:~.nni:·!r; of the 
lixth century. With suoh compelling evldanoe, it is di!flcult 
,"0 explain Dionys1us's Dissitnulatlon. This snould not, howevor, 
~ For a comprehensive study of this point see the Dlctionnaire 
2. Theolof.ji.e Cethollg.ue, h3l-1~.32. ' 
lessen our estimation of the \1orks. We may, qlJ.i te lOf~ltimntoly 
and .th the authority of ~£ny great scholars, consider the Areo-
pagite's dissimulation as literary fiction; such a practice in 
his day was not only entirely permitted but was even considered 
laudable.4 Dionyslus, most likely, thought that writin~; with 
authority was the best means he could use to answer the problems 
that taxed the minds of thinkers of his day. His works have 
great intrinsic value; on this score most ot all we should judge 
their merit. 
Dionysius was mentioned as an authority for the first 
time in the religious conferences a t Constantinople duri'1€': the 
early part of the sixth century. Here his works wore quoted as 
apostolic by the Severlan Monophysitas in defense of their pecu-
liar J..ionophysite doctrines. "The very first citations of his 
works that one finds were made Ly the monophys1te, Severus, pa-
triarch of Antioch. at the Council ot: Tyre, whlch could not have 
been later than t he year .513 ... 5 Though the Catholics rejeoted 
thec;e wri tinga as probably apocryphal, t he Vi arks of Dionys1us 
loon won the recognition ot all great scholars. The influence 
they exerted was due chiefly to great wrlters of the time who 
~ C .E.Rolt, Dionlsius the Areopagi te, btacill11ian Co., New York, 
1920 2 - - - -~ ttL • • ~ . . 
'" el premieres ~itatlons quton en trouve,' sont faitee par Ie 
monophysita stvo~e, patriarched l Antloche, dans un'concilc de 
Tyr qui ne pout etre posterieur a l'an 513." Godet, 431. 
quoted them with ':rJ.thOl"i ty. (; 
In sp1te of the tact that there was a contradiction 
between the lite and the words of the author, all his writings 
continued to have considerable influence. This influence wns 
due chiefly to the commentary on the works of Dlonysius written 
by Max1mus Contessor. The translator's own works had already 
been accepted as orthodox; this added to the favorable interpre-
tation of the works of D1onysius. In the year 757 Pope Paul sent 
the Greek text of Dlonysiu.s l works to the Gallican Church. For 
almost a whole century they lay untouched, a hidden trea.sure, in 
the Abbey of Saint Denis.7 Finally, the eentulry' old <i.ust was 
brushed off the volmr.es, and Hilduin, the Abbot of the monastery, 
with t he aid of a few collaborators, translated t,he YfOJ::>lrs of 
pseudo-Dlonyslus. Only a fow years latel'O John Scotue F:r1gena, 
at the l"Oquest of Charles the Bald, began h15 Latin translation 
01" the Cor~us.8 Through the translations of Brieena, D10nyslue 
became the chief exponent 0;£ tho Greek trad1tion of the indirect 
Platonic influence upon Christian thiruting. 'rho erfects of this 
translation were felt considerably durine the Middle Ages, even 
6 Cayre. 91. 
7 W.J. Sparrow-Simpson" "lJ..'he Influence of Dionysius in Relig10us 
HlstOlT. It D10nls1ua the' Af92§QRite, transl. by E.E.Rolt .. 
Macmillan Co., New' 'YOrIC, . , 0263. 
8 De Wult, 68. 
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001'8 than YI8 o:xpec t. 9 Soholal'S began looldng to D1onysluo as the 
"culmen o£ Flaton1am."lO 
It 18 not surpr131nJ. therefore, that some or tho 
great men ot the !l1ddle Aeea wrote commentaries on tho wor-ks. 
Men like Hugh ot Saint Victor, saint Albert,and Sa1nt Bonaventure 
turt.hol' onhanced the influence or Dionyaius by their ext ens 1 va 
oommentarios on his works.11 Saint Thomas htmselt not only 
quotes D10nyslus qu1to frequently but also wrote a commentary on 
the l2! pi v~pl. l~lp.lbu8.. In t he light ot this histOl'ioal data, 
it 1s evident that tho naza Qr Dlon".1ua was then not unknown to 
groat !~Gn as it 1e tada)". ftAt that tltte, th~oloSlQ:rllJ, asoetic. 
and my_ticnl, liturgists a.nd Ell yen artisto, found insp1rat1on in 
the works ot the '<Areopaglte.,.,12 
The Corea jl.rG,oaa&i t1c!5! which 18 extant contains tour 
treatIses and ten lettere. or the four treat1ses, two of them., 
the 1?!. 01 vin1.a, tiom1,R1 bUlB. and also the Mzst1ca f..h601ros1~, are 
concerned wIth God and the knowledge of God. The other two, 
egeleratia 1l1erarphla and ;Soolosias,Plca p,lerarohla, deal with the 
twofold hierarchy_ Thea.,grks are entlre17 tree trom and avoid 
• • r p, r , •• 
any controversial spirit in the rnnnnerot presentation of the 
doctrine. This 1s the a uthor'. deliberate intent aa lsseen so 
otten in the works themselves. He was not interested in re-
fut1ng the Greoks, hI. intentions were to expound the Christian 
philosophy .,Dd theology in the light of the p'hl1oeophy and theo-
log;t h{J) had learned i'rom the Greeks. lIe seemed tOlBnt to show 
h18 reader. that the rnere tact ot proving scnothlng •• wrong did 
not estahlish hie own vicwa aa tr'"y.e.13 
D10nyaius usos his "arks .s a flllU\1'lC or showing us bow 
we can get to know ('rod. He then GOOli on to tall U.3 how \"Ie learn 
who God is. In hls writings he seaos to .atab11ah throo ciistinct 
\>.,aya in whl011 the human mind can arr!. vo at the knowladco !Jf' God • 
.£<'lrst of all Dlonys1us tells us that God 1s "'0).11 ~Vtl,l.(.OS' the Ood 
of many names. n. _ays this because atLl tho.. th1nss that tht3 
hunlan mind knows and the things that the senaes of man br1ng in-
to the scope of his consc1ousness, all are .e 80 mAn7 manif •• ta-
tiona ot God. What uan be 8!l1d of inferiors can also be said of 
the .Iuperlor nature that 1s the cau.e at the 1nr.rl()l''''8.11~ The 
explanat10n of: th1~ point 1s the t atal t heme of the De D1 vln1a 
- , 
Nondnlbua. Becau •• In this way all the perf'ectlons that are 
$ J I t I' 11. 
found in tr18 Cl'cuiturcu are affirmed ot their first CaURG, their 
c:reatoz,; th1. way of arrll~at1on 18 called the Yla A.t,r.1'1'"'f!1:p..t.f.pni~s • 
.... I "' r 1 it m * .,. 
And yet 1. t i.e Ql.li te evident, Dionye1.us affirms, that these names 
can be equally denied a.1: the first cause because it 1s so trans-
cendent by nat'u'Eh The first cause, so superior to all second";' 
ary causes and to all creatures, must have perfections that are 
far superior to these. '!'here f' are , all the names th.at are ["1 ven 
thll first cause as the cause at all beings can also be denied of 
that first cause on the grounds of its transcendent nature. This 
denial of nem as in the f lrst cause ot all being 1s the bas is of 
the .y!! NeGationi.s. Dut we must be very c8.1'eful when we so.y 
this. This denial 0:J.' names does aot get us ultimately to an in-
determination as so .J1any philosophe.l."s, sncient as wall as modarn, 
have been led to conclude. Rathel' it leads to a tr'anscendent 
nature that contains all these perfections in a manne.!' .car super-
ior to the way in which these perfections are found in the in-
feriors. 11'01'" this reason our knowledge of the first cause does 
not stop at negations. Atter we have denied the perfections as 
found in inferior beings to the first cause, we then ~)o up to 
a higher step. The knowledge of the first cause ends finally in 
the affirma.tion of the super-nature of the first CCiuse. '1'1'1is 
way of knowing :finally the super-nature of t he first detel"min-
ing ca ....... se of all tlllngs is called ·the Via Exccllentla~.15 These 
-
last two ways oj: knowing God are tloeated by Dlonysiu.s in the 
!1stiea ?he,?lofJ.a. J.vt:n though this thr(H,j~'old division i8 not so 
-
15 ~ Dlvlnip. Nominl~u3, 1,1. 
clearly outlined as this 1n the writings ot Dlotl,.81u.j however, 
the basi. of the divIsion 18 certaInlr evident in all his work •• 
The interest ot thi8 paper lie8 first and foremost in 
the !!! :!l:r&rstfoAl .•. t throughout the .p.!. D1 vlp.l~ N~mlp,lbUJ!. thII 
attll"matl ve .ay 18 moat frequent17 m.a:-kod bY' the use ot the wOrda 
d.~r~ Ol'~ex'-. The significance or theS8 _we •• iona '11'111 be aeoft 
in • tew moment.. Firat ot aU Will be stud1ed the stages or 
knowledse through wh1ch t he soul goes bet ore comine; to the high-
.8 t knowledge, th.e knowledee otthe cause ot all things. Then 
w111 be •• en the various attributes the soul ar£lrms of this 
high.st eauae and also how It does th1s. .Finally, the highest 
Pl"&,:1ic,te at this. a tinal cause wl11 be analrzed. 
The soul, DdOD1Siu8 goes on to show, bas a threefold 
activIty or motion (It~V""£s). Th ••• DlOtlons are the three stag •• 
or knowledge. In the low.st .tage the soul move. straight tore-
ward (K~r' f~g£14V). In thia motion it doea not turn within tt-
.elf but turns,outward upon all the things around it and exper-
iences the influence at the wOl"ldall around 1 tSf)lt • "Sed ad a. 
quae ipsl vicina aunt progreditur."16 The activit,. oenters 
'. .... ~, 
around. tb1nga Em ,Wv ~ 3'-'! • This activit,. never ria •• above a 
knowledge or the material, tana!ble thing. prattered the soul 
through t be use at the seneea b1 the '\'tWld outside it. This ao-
tlv1t,' or the soul. can b. called the .phere or sensation. 
A ,edond motion, at upwe.rd and spiral motion (iAt KO-
l(~s) takes plaoe when t he soul 1. enlightened 'by great truths 
1n a prooess of discursive reaaon1ns (ttcog1tando et dlaourrendott ). 
When the aoul acta thua it mIk es uae of knowledge drawn trom the 
precedlns act1vlty but gOe8 on to more universal oonclusions. 
"Oblique vero oletux' animus, quando pro captu 1U0 notlonlbua 
d1v1ni. 111uatratur, non sp1rltal! quldem unite modo, sed cogit. 
sndo et dlscurrendo quasi permiatla tluxlsquo actlan1bus. tt17 
Flanll,. the soul moves ln fa c1rcular motlon b~VI(~LK~} 
) , 
when it tUl'n8 away trom all things that 11e out.ide It.elf (<<7TO 
~ "~ TWV L~"') and oenters lta attentlonon the things that ooeuP7 and 
are oentered in it. own mind. It ooncentrates on 1ts own powera 
and oomes tlnall,. to the principle that gives un1ty to all tb1ngS4 
This principle af uni t'1 11 t he O'ood whlch i& beyond. all things. 
It 1s one and ls the same. without beg1nning and w1 thout end. 
( 
• ~" • ~I .. 4-' .., .. , I ," J 
r D VTTte 7Tdv"rtJ,. T.< ovrtiL,l(t!I,l. ev /(elt t"'ctVl'DY, /(iIlL tl(Y.{f~otl' Kttll .( rEA-
I 
tUt:I71:'OV.) The highest and most perfeet activIty ot the ;;~oul 
18 the oontemplation and t be mental aotivlt)" oentered a:bout the 
Good, the Beautiful, the One, all ldent1t1 •• in the f1nal prin-
C1ple. Once tm. 80ul hal reached, this h1ghtust and moat perfEH3t 
activit,-. once it concentrates on the Good u tho highest prin-
-
". ) •• 
17 IV, 9. 
oiplo of all things, there can be no greater actlvlt7 poss1ble 
tor the IOul. Therefore, in the language ot Plato, the 80ul haa 
reached its "~f£r~."la 
lior i8 1 t mere aecldent that the soul comea finall,. to 
the knowlodge or tho Good. All thinss are grounded In the Good, 
trom it all things bava rece1ved the1r being, have received all 
that t hey are, tUld b'1 it they art.. being constantl,. preserved in 
their 'being. "Qu1n ot earum flrm1taa hIno, at stabili tas at con-
servatl0, bonorumque pabulum pendet.n19 Not onlr do they retain 
their own Id.entlt7 veoause or tho Good, but all th1ngs are what 
they are because ot the Good. 'the,. receive, in other' words, 
their ve1'7 being t'ttOltl the Good. Now this 18 true or all thing., 
even ot loula and ot the aotivities ot the souls. ftAnlmae quoque 
ac qua.1ibet an~ bona aunt per bonltatem 1110 (J,d.. rnv ~1Ttf­
~!~No~), quae omne bouu. superat, tnde provenlt, il108 1nte1leotu 
praed1t.a ease, vttam habere 8ubatantlalem, corruption!. expert .. , 
ut 8a.. hal)oant OUlll angell. oonllN.ne. ,,20 Prom t he Good and becaw.se 
ot the Good all thing. have be1ng and reta1n their respect1 •• 
tt.,., ( :t , ... ("., A ) 1 luGing £1< r4l(YDL 80 a) and 0'.( rtllL'~pov • Beoau •• of this tact a 1 
thing. manltolft the Good in themsalve., by the very tact that the,. 
18 We must be oa~erul to dlst1ngu1abbeoau.e Dionyslu8 does be-
tween the word "Junl° (vOv~) UJled to d •• ignate angola, .. nd . 
'hn1mu.tt (tI'lIX"';) uaed' to designate the rational poftra or man, 
and tn a wl~.r sinse, the vital principle or ~. ~Z ¥V, Pi:1n1F AOJ\1n1pup, IV. 1. 
exist and are what they are, they point to and proclaim t be ex-
istence ot the Good, whioh ia the cause ot their very being. 
"Ipsamet tor.ma bonltatl. ipsi. data .at, conceaaumque, ot ut 
latentem ~ a. bonitatem val. ant enuntlare.u21 Tbua t~b 
oreated thIngs the soul riaes to the knowledge ot • cauae that 
, , I 
must ex1st trom t be ver"1 tact that all things exist ... Z-L "''' pct.~ cL 
~~""'" I ~ , , 
't'OV U£DV erro /C"Cl.tr~W5 KtJf".LI.OlJ ro,s 17oL",.u.-''''' V"OV~EV',", XtI( 8-
0f~rllL' .u22 Thus In tIle mind of Diony'slu8 the efficIent crea-
tive and 8uatainlne cause of all th1n£a waa identlfied with the 
final go .. ot the soul t • knowledge becausc the funct10n of each 
ot theae causos taken 1ndlv1dua~17 bad ultimately to be identl. 
tled in ono and the 8amB cause. 
We bave .een how tbings reoeive their very being trom 
the fIrst caus., the first prinoiple or all thlngs. Now it 1. 
equall,. true to la1 t hat all things a1m a t the Good u theIr 
laat end 01" a t tho pertection of thelr being. The good tor each 
indl vldual be1ng 1. satheXted up in the t otali tr ot the Good be-
cause the good as the cause of all t hlnss l3'.\\lat al:read'1 contain 
the pertectlon of' all beings to whioh it 1s goIng to first glve 
that perfection. All thinss strive tor the perfectlon at theIr 
beins, th1s 1$ thelr pI'opel" end and 1& round In the tlnal cause, 
the Good.. Beoau •• ot this all th1ll€s 8t1"1V6 tor t he Good u tor 
thalr tinal end. "Bonumque illud est ex quo omnia constiterunt 
.... 1t' II 
r '''"' 
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at velut1 a perfectis81ma causa producta aunt, at in qua consist-
unt un1 versa ••• et ad quod omnia, ta.'nQ,uam ad .finem q.J.aeque suum. 
convertuntur, quodque appetunt uni versa •. ,,23 
Dionyslue goes on to saytbat a process to lnfinltl 
1n explaining participation is tapoes1ble by the very nature of 
beings which are finite. ,'We must como, finally, to the Oood 
whieh is good not because ot participation but by its vcr., essence 
~nd be1ne;. "Et sic quia o£ulent1. ·1IUa bonus cst Deus, ut tam.qWlWl 
substantiale bonum, bonltatem 1n omnia porrigat.K24 The Good~ 
then, pours ita goodness on all beings and then draws all thinss 
to itself bytbe vet!1 tact that it ls £ioodne88 by lts very nature. 
Deoaus. of the tact thtlt it i. the Oood that gtves being to all 
things and (11"""$ all things to itselt .s their tinal end, the 
Good i8 the principle and primal cause ot all things. 
Atque ut omnia bonita. ad Be convertit, 
pr1maque, Quae disperse aunt, colliglt, 
tamquam uniflea dlv1nltas et principium 
unitatis, omniaque lp.~ at prlnolplum, ut 
cc>mplexum, ut f'ltlem o.ppetunt; bonumque '1llud 
eBt (ut Scrlptyra saora testatur) ex quo omnia 
constlterunt.2> 
Were there anything beJ'Ond the Good 1n the order of oausee, there-
tore, that oause and not tbe Good, wuld be the end to which all 
things w~ld aspire. aD 
• 
all th1~:;s aspire, l:ta.$ far treater 1m.po%·tnnc0 1n the phIlosophy 
01' DioXlyci'..l.s than 1s at .fir!Jt evident. The v 6l"Y .fact that Dian,.-
stu8 t attention \'roO oonte;-ed on tho c&use of all. t;r.lings (<<i -rL-. 
71"cI("rwv) and the end 01" all t hinge (Z"e).o~ ""''''';;;11') expla1ns wb7 
Coodness because ot Whi:.t 1t 18 booamo the very foundatlon of his 
philosophical systom. Upon the 1dea ot the Good depended the 
ram1t1catj.on ot hi. sYltem of' ph11oaophy.27 
So fundamental as thin idea of th~ OOO',i .for Dlonys1us 
that within tho scope or its extension 181 not only being but 
non-baing An well. "S1quid.em nomen boni de neo declarat omnes 
emanation.a auotorla omnlum, et porr161tur Mec naminatic Del 
a bono tum ad ea quae aunt, tum ad ea quae non sunt, estque aupel'l 
0& quae sunt, tit super eB quae non aunt. ,,28 The Good, then, 11ea 
above being because both baing and ~bc1ng Ql~ pnrtlo1patlo%l$ 
of 1 t. .o1onyslus quite emphatlcall,. states that non .. be1ng is as 
muoh a partioipation or tho Good a8 bolUS, lest anyone f.l1sundor-
stand his meaning_ Be expressos tlus ldea ~1te cogently whon 
, ,:I' he w:rites: ·'Audebo etlam hoc dioere, 1d q,uod non est (r~ MI1 "vo), 
pulohrum .t bonum partleipare. rt29 If the Good already contains 
both the good. and. the be1ng ot all things, and bualdes oontains 
'-'I L:rifn~ ciarli~' and Ruddle. k, Jl. !I1.t~rl gE.. Phl1ca0Ez. F. S. 
Crotts • Oat, K •• York, 19~1J ~. 
28 De Vlvin!. Nomlnlbu8, V, 1. 29 -rv,· 1.' t I I 
· . 
..... /;,.1 
There 1s reaaon to wonder how Dlon1s1u& explains the 
way in which non .... ouinD, participates 1nthe Cood. Tbe explanation 
f;iven is q.ulte simple; it 1s easy to see how D10019iu8 was for-
ced to draw this conclusion 1n the 11"'bt of the root of his b 
pbl10tlopby. lie explains 1 t thus: ffIllud 111!'.iWi quod non 6iit (rD 
, " ) 
,.£(11 0" ,. 1111uIl quod tNpra 1'08 omnea est, bonl iIe51,doria tenatut·, 
( 
, , i\ ..... 
'luiu stierJ. in bono • ., r-<y" "'~) VGl'E> supl;JrDubstantial1 pel' o::.m1um 
u.~latlonol:l1 ot'lse cont(;lnd!t.n ,30 l"rol:J thin ntat4~mel'lt we conclude 
(,!!e.sldorJ. . o,) for the Good. B'1 its vor;r naturo non-being could 
not partlel;?ate 1n 1:"01118; It 1s directly opposed to b cirli:. Yet, 
Dlonysiu8 art1rt'\8, 1. t cttn ahll or atr1 ve fOlll the Good becausf'1, it 
can atr! va for the partioular good that 1 t can have and yet does 
not have. Dlo117s1us g1v€le 1..18 anothex· clue to the nature of non-
being wben 11(, goes on to say. f't1)es1det"st cn1m 111ud otlam ld 
quod non OKs1stlt, ut diotum ost, ot al1quo modo in ipso esse 
contend1 t, quoniam IpSUD1 est quod formam rebus fonna carentlbu8 
tr1bult, at in ipso otlam ld qu()d non est, supra el:UlEmt1am die!-
tur, ot oflt.-31 From this quotation it can be 8 aid that D10n1-
sit.:.s consldeps the Good HS thvt w~lich CtV(~B fornl to t}la~~ which 
C08S not havo 1'o::'''m.. Non-beinp~, which ar; yet does not have form, 
~ims at or has a desire r or the r orm whi eh it can have f rom the 
poed. This stri vine: for or d(.;sire for a form make8 of non-being 
11 participation of the Good. Non-being is that wt.l.ich is form-
iless but still has a desiro for t he Good. Therefore, the parti-
cipation in the Good extends to being as well as to non-being, to 
Ithe. t which has form as well as to that which lacks form. The 
lood, therefore, atanding above both being and non-being, has the 
oighest position, the primacy, in the ontological order. From 
~t proceed by participation all being and all non-being. 
When Dlonyslus uses the word non-being, he means one 
,r these three things. First of all, he could be refer:r>ing to 
l"he non-being of Cod, whtch he often "r:akos montion of whon he 
~peaks of the lli Neeiationla. This restricted use is always very 
~v1dent it-om the context. Zecondly. it can refer to the non-being 
)f evtl. Evil a.s evil cannot exist on the plane of being; it 
~xists .... if this 'Word CDn be useEl when speaking c£ evil - .. only 
~ith an affinity w1th the Good. Evil Slue. ev11 neither has nor 
'onf'ers being, and is neither cood nor cor..i'81"s cood. ttlpsum e:nim 
nalum neque est neque bonum est. tt.32 It is only boca'~ae of 1 ts 
2 IV, 20. 
affInity with a good that evil can be said to be positive and 
produotive at all. f!hen non-being, therefore, i8 uaed in the 
place or ev11, it 1s 4sed 1n a 8ens6, strictl,. speaking, even 
lower than non-being b~cause, whereas non-belng pal'tlcipatss 1n 
the Oood and desires tho Good as ita end, evil noither part!-
. 
elpatea 1n t he Good nor d eslres an end, and 1s alwa18 admix .. 
with being. Whe~e the i8 "no being" th.re 18 no evil. Evil 18 
absolute non-existenoe. "Malum. autem nee 1n el. q\.u.te sunt, nee 
1n ela quae non aunt, sod eo et1am non est, remotlu8 est a bono:3~ 
Therefore, tbe term non-beiuf:, 1s used ot evil onlT in a very 
broad sense. For all practical purposes, this idea ot the non-
being ot ev11 has tor Dlonlsiua the same meaning I.e "privation 
has tor later philosophers. Howver, »101l781u8 never makes us. 
ot that word. 
More p1"Operl,. non-heine; 1'81'er8 to matter which i8 the 
formless .tutt that ••• ka or haa a )"8aMlng for a rON in the 
GOod.J4 In Tor,. simple tams Dionyalu8 argues in this "7- Mat-
t&r 18 t bat whioh 18 formless and eeeks a torm_ But that 'II11ch 
18 tormless 1s no~bt1ng. Therefore, matter 11 non-being. 
~.l IV, 19. 
34 IV, 18. 
Saint Thoma. explains quite well how Dlon181u8 oomes 
49 
to thls concluslon.35 Dlon7s1ua talls to dIst1nguish between a 
prl vat10n and what he moans by mattel". Consequently, matter be-
comes a non-~,~, which participate. in t he Good in so tar as 1 t 
seeks its forma.tlon in the Oood. By its very nattU'o it (loss not 
aeek participatIon in !n! boeause "nihil ante appetlt nIsI slbl 
s1ml1ot fl36 Since ma.ttor 1s a non-being, it cannot seek the In-
formation ot beins. which 1. ita oppos1te. No'll the obvious con-
clusion tor Dlo%l7alus to draw trom thIs thesis 1s th.at the ox-
tension at the Good 18 greater tt~nUle extension ot being. 
We can look upon thIs 1nterpretation in another light. 
In the 8,.atem of Dion7s1u8 lt 18 not in the 11ne of predication 
but in the line ot causalit1 that the Good extends ltself both 
to being and to non-being.J7 Oonsequently, our notion or nan-
being does not mean simply that whlch doea not exist -- "non 
ea simpliciter quae penitus non sunt,,,38 _. but. instead, that 
.hlah 18 in potency and u yot not in aot. But 1 t 18 neoes8tU7 
to make the d1at1nctlon that D1onyalu8 was OQNtul to y:-.ako. The 
potenc7 which 1s non-being in this systom. 1$ in patane,. to tho 
act whioh OL'"l be g1ven it by the o.ood alone, it 1s not in potency 
• • , 1 • I ••• TU 
Corderll," S. DI0~.11 
!l1gne, parta, I13S~ ~8. 
So 
to t he act wh;tch 18 alreadY' :rea11.ed. t.rheretore, tho potency 
or non.-belng, as far as Dlon:ra1uD 1$ concerned, doen not &1...'1'11 at 
or str! ve for the act contained. in being but tor the a ct con-
tained 1n tbe Good. 'rhe Good. then, 1n so tel'" as 1. t bnpllea the 
notion or final cause, draws to itself both tbat which 1s 1n act 
aa woll as thAt which ls 1n potenc,.." Then again, that whioh la 
1n aot has form. It has already been seen how Dloo,)"slue znakes 
that whlch has form, be1ng. on the other band, that whIch 1s 
formless 18 what 18 1n potencY' to act. tor D100781u8 thi8 Is the 
fundamental meaning ot non-belng. Summaril,., then, both being 
and non-boinS. the formed and the formless, act and potency, 
strive tor L~ aim at the Good aa theIr own particular good. As 
such the Oood 1s t he ;fundamental ontological principle and ulti-
mate goal of all things. 
All bas been aeen rrom the VArious quotat.1oll$ alread,. 
c1ted rrom the Wl"lt111{~s ot Dlon:yslua, t be Good in his philosophi-
cal system i8 ident1f1od w1.th the God or his theological alatem. 
All that haa been said of the Oood 18 to be SQid or God beoause 
• 
the two are reall,. identioal. "Quia a1e easent1a sua bonue Gat 
Deul, ut tamquam su.batan tiale bOllUll (~r' ,;;, ,1v6(, r~ :t!d.Btfv, ~s 
~u .. ,wJf.~ -<:,6(6'0".)039 What haa been •• d ot the d~.,d 13 ,lR80 
tacto true ot God because the Good 18 that whlch pours out 1ta 
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goodness by participation on all things. while it itself does 
not participate in goodness but is goodness 1 tself.. This is 
exactly what 1s meant by the word God. Every good that 1s not 
1ts own goodness is good by participation. But God, bein[ the 
source of all things cannot and does not participate either in 
goodness or in anything else. By His very nature He is [oodnessltO 
So too, the Good is perfect goodness; it does not participate in 
goodness but is goodness by its very nature. Therefore, Dion,.. 
sius identities the words God and Good, wluchare identical in 
reality. Because the Good is the summit of perfection and be-
cause the Good is identified with God, Dionysius concludes that 
the highest name of God is "the Good." "Ae primum perfectum at 
quod omnes Dei emanationes manifestat. boni nomen expendamus."41 
lFor this reason we can readily see why Dionyslus uses the two 
lWords interchangeably throughout his entire work. 
In the light of the lmowledge of the Good, it is easy 
to see why Dlonysius insists that the "He who is" of Scripturo 
must be applied 1n a very special way to God.42 Eeinr: 1s pre-
dicated of God in e. causal and partieipatln9' way_ Ood embraces 
all being and produces all bein!j in the very sa.roe sense that the 
Good Eives being to all t:-lings. God is not beine: inthe strict 
lense any more than the Good 1s being. But being is the first 
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participation of the Good; for this reason t he Good 1s said to 
be being. So also being is thef1rst participation ot God. 
Therefore, God is said to be being in so ta.r as being is !Hs 
first participatlon. "Deus enim non quov1s modo est ena, sed 
slmplicitel" €It ini'ini te in se pariter complexus at e.nticipans. n43 
But then again he says: "Primum igitur donum pEtl' .llh.J t1SSt1 cum pt11' 
£Ie 1110. supraquam (slc) bonitas producat merlto ab antiqulo~e at 
pr1ma omnium particlpa.tionum. laudatur, et est ex ipsa at in ipsa 
Ipsum. per 86 €I 8se,"44 God is being In the senae that being is 
the first participatlon at Hia divine nature. 
Strictly speaking, just as God 1s not being, 
80 aleo being is not God, it is only the 
flrst of all the participations ot God, and 
as it was just said. t ~5condition of all the 
other (participations).4 
The importance ot this conclusion 1s not im:lsdiately 
evident. Exe:r.1inatlon ot: the doctrine leads to the c one Ius ion 
that Dlonyslus has a scale ot: being starting with pp~ !! being, 
which ls absolute being and t he first pal'tt1clpatlon of the Good, 
then uni versAl being, which is the b einr: found 1n the vf.l.l"ious 
modes of' participation (e.g., the mode ot: being' that is found 
in all rational beings, in anirJ'lu1 lifo, or in pl;ant life), and 
-
~ V; h.. I: V, 6. A "  ~A properment parler, do mama que Dleu nte~t pas l'etrs, l' 
etre n'est pas Dieu; il n'est que 1& primiere de toutes les 
, A participations Iii Dieu, (:1 t comme il vient d'etl'S dit, 1& con-
dition de toutes les autres." Gl1son, 84. 
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tinally the being that is found in a particular being (e.g., in 
this particular man, or animal, or plant).46 Nor is this scale 
limited to the participation 01' being alone. The very same 
modes of participation are equally epplicable to th6 VB.l"'loL~s de-
grees of llfe, wisdom, intelligence, light, truth, power, J'l~tice, 
and all t he other qualities wherein all creatur&s t;Uit partici-
pate, finally, in being also. partlcipate.47 Each of these 
scales of participation has a definite place in the hierarchy 
which culminates in and ramifies fl~Ol1l. the Good, 
Deco.use the mest universal of all the pa.rticipations 
is being, it is considered the first paI'tlcipation that procedes 
from the Good. The more univers5),l thf'l extension of a particular 
participation, the hieber it is in the scale of participation. 
The importance ot this scale of partiCipation for 
Dionysius is this. He has to conclude that because being is 
the fi~st in the scale of participations, for that ~eason it must 
be the fi~st and the most impo~tant name given to the Good. So 
allo with all the othe~ part1cipations. Each can be predicated 
of the Good, and therefore of God, because it is a mode of parti-
Cipation. The importance of each of these 1s proportioned to its 
place in the scale or participation. That is why it can be said 
-
~1 Corder'iuB, 958. 
'+- l2!.f?!2.~ ;.t:orrrtni,pu8, V, :5. 
that all thinGs form a definite pattern of participation that 
leads to the knowledge of the Good. All nature 1s a definlte 
"theoPhany.,,48 
Dionysius compares this ramifIed participatlonJf the 
Good to the sun shini.ng down on all creatures. Just as tho sun 
by its very nature pours out its light on all t.lngs, so also 
the Good pours out the rays 01' its goodness upon all things. 
Quemadmodum enim sol ll1e noster non 
cogitatione aut vo1untate, sed eo ipso 
quod est, llluminat universe quae quoquo 
modo lucis ejus aunt capacia; sic enlm 
ipsum boaum Ipsamet substantIa sua, rebus 
omnibus, pro cujusque captu, toLlus boni-
tatis suae radios affundit.~9 
This compar1son, so very typIcal of NeoplatonI0 philosophy,50 re-
veals that the "b~te noir" of Platonism, that a higher power in 
the hierarchy of partIcipation t~al'sm:!. ts power to and influencos 
directly a lower power, has teen incorporated into the philosophy 
of Dionysius. It Dlonysius really held this doc trine, it would 
mean tha.t he believed that a 11 v1nG beine, for example, would be 
ablo to pass on life to another by its own power without the dir-
ect influence and causality of the Good.51 Yet this is true only 
if D10nyslus subscribed to all thB consequences of the comparison 
he used. We do know that he usce3d t he comparison) 1 t is not evl-
-
ttB~l Gilson, 82. ~ De .Pi vinls Nom1nibus .. IV, -1. 
!;lal""tl.n; Clarli, and Hudd1ek, 264. 
51 Gilson, 82. 
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dent 1:rmtedlately whother h", was willing to ailiuit all tho C0l188-
quonces 0: this comparison. Eecauss tho comparison was apropos 
to the Idoas he was explaining, he made use of it. It l1lQy have 
mearJ.t no m.ore to hl111 than jus t that. 'rho cOfnpariaon su.r!l.lul'izes 
qu.ite well his ideas .. but should be taken, from all appeur-tt:1<;'cu, 
only as a co:tnpaz.'1soIi. 
It is upon this idoa that the entlre sy-stetl 
of Dlonysius f phllosophy really l'estz. To 
u.se a figure" this idea. establishes the frame-
work of his philosophy; at th<,summit of the 
whole world ls God, 'IV ho can be 1magined as an 
immense nourco of lifht, and even aathe light 
itself; and from thl~ bl~zing tire radiate 
cOLtntless I'ays, q\dte distinct, but harl'¥lon .... 
iOlls, wld with a hierarchical pattern, and 
the ~·jO:i.'':~ b.rilllant mid ;:;crf'E:ct .as they ~et 
closer to their uncroated source; this em~ 
at1.on or th(. lI::!lt :. ... e.d.:l.o.tlng fl"O::.u God -- an 
etfect ot the dIvIne goodness -- ditfuses it-
sel!' Yllthout Intor~:'1.1.ptlon down to tho vc:'y 
last degree ot the hierarchy ot·laings. In 
ow:' ret.urn movement Vie arc able. as ','Ie clLllb 
step b7 step, to reach the very wellspring 
of Ol.~r ueine:;, OUI' first principle.52 
Yet daspi te the fact t~-,at £:;0 l[,u,;.h vi' hur~n knowledgo indicates 
L 
" I , Ctest sur cetta 1dee que repose en reallte toute la phl1o-
sophie D:1onysi~)nne, q .... c en determine pour a1nsi dire, Ie 
cadreJ au sommet du monde il y a Diau, concu comma una 1~ 
, A 
;:;,unac foyer de lu.rdel~o, ,COm.:;10 la lum1ere 11Cl'llej de ct'; foyer 
jnl11lt u..rye r!'ll1tlpl1clte de rayons dlstincts, mals ha.r-mon-
is6s, hi6rarchis&s, d'autant plus brillants at plus pal~ 
f~its quIlls sa rapprochent de leur source tncre~e; c.otta 
eme.nation -- a partir de Dleu -- de le. l\IDl~.ere arfet do Ie. 
bont6 divine, ze propage sans interrupt10n jusqu'au de~nier 
, ./ A deere de 1a hierarchle des etres. ot clans notre mouvement de 
/ ~ " I'cto'.lI', nOl.1.S pouvons. en noua e10vant d.s degre en dee:;re; 





tho exIstence of the Oood... and desp! te the :i'act that orea.tures 
manifest the nature or the Good, D10nyslus finally says that 
the h~~~ mind cannot know the Good God as Ho real17 ls. "Etentm 
• . (:I' ~, oum. not ... ones omneo s1nt cntltatum, f)t ~n ent.ltlltes ~,~ T~ "",r-'.) 
tCrlu:!.ncntur, 1. qui omni entltate su'bl1mlor est, omrwra q:.ltJql.,..O 
arcug! t ooeni t1onr.'Hn. ".53 S1nce God 1 s Bimself £10 .c"l~ s'Upo!'ior" to 
the ei'I'oats ot.' Hls f>\O~,1.."10tia thut ru,"Q x!lcnif'oct in €ill ~l:dnLs, 
D1on;,"'Siu8 concludes that ut').t1 113 "~"Qr that 1't.'Hl!10n really f'I.mneless. 
Attor all tho names of the quallt1etl !'o\.md in crcaturen l:.a\'e been 
predioated oJ.' Goa, fhUllly t.J:~) hur:.mn l1l1nd must conolude that it 
can know nothing of' the c'''ue nature of: Ood. God possesses all 
names bocause He is the CAuse oJ.' all th1uga J He is without Da!ll8 
bee~u8o He transcends altogether all the o!'i'eets ot H1s goodness 
that the hu:num mind kn.ows. "Hoe 19itu.r cum 8clrent th~ologl. 
Deum laudant at tamquam nomine oarentem, at ab omn1 n{'lmine."54 
In the 'Writings of DlorJ781us the arr 1 rrnatl VI) th801ogy, 1M hleh 
attributes to God all the names attributed to ereatu:res thet He 
causes. thus t1nd~ its count~~part 1nt hA negatIve theology, 
wh1ch ut')nies all the nlunes thus p'hrfln. Th~ neeatl VEll theolo£'7 
thus lead.e to a higher knowlodgo ot God. 
Zhef'& is ,ttO dCly1nt.~ t.h& faot that .for Dlonyslua the 
11& ~.i.a.t1oll.i ... " leemingl;y takes all J:lJan1nC QVHiJ from tbe ~ !:!_ 
-
... 1 I f ••• , T $l II", 
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fircationla. When D10nyslus expla1nsthe y!! Negat1o~~~, he make. 
God 7~ere1.y the unknown cause of all things. Thus the perfections 
in God a.""e not known; God, e s a cause of all things, is perfect 
and has perfections onl'r in so tar as He is a c Quae of all ;Jer ... 
fecti!:ms in things. Dionysius never stopped to make a c l€~t!'-cut 
distinction betwc::n the PUl'.fGctiOll which is kno,:,:~ a.nd t :l'l"~ :.. ~,:r.:llt;­
cd l'1alUler in whlch t!'1at porfection Is found in crcatu!'es. Thus 
it was rath~}r tlif'.ficult for h1;n to predicate these perfections 
found in croat:"lres as per1\)ctions ':::'cu."1d also in. the Good God. 
Nor yet docs the mina of Dlonysius rest in the quost 
for the knowlede:e of God. Dionysius goes on to show tha t thcI\'.:'i 
iA still a higher way, the way of mystical theology, which unites 
us more co~npletelY' with the Good. The way of affirmation leads 
us to know the nature of the Goed f!::l the cause of all perfections 
1n creatures. The way or neFation shows that the nature of the 
Good is not the same in Rny way as t hat found in t he effects of 
that Good found in creatures. Finally. the way of superexeel-
lence or 5uper'eminence leads to the I!lystieal insi;":ht into the 
tr'J.e nat'ul'e of the Good. Throur:;h the mystical way of superex-
ce12ence the human soul is tul1 ted to the 'transcendent nat.~re of 
God. 11~1e only Wtl.y in whi.ch the soul c an be united to God :1.n this 
mystical way is by excess 01' love; since 10\"6 is the cause 01' this 
union, Dio!lYS ius explains the place of love in his philosophy. 
Love alone is 'the way to the last, the h1shest, tile l'f.!.ost per.fect, 
the most profound knowledge of God.55 
In so far as He is transcendent, 
He cannot be named, He is t he great "Unnamed." 
But the names that we give to God never at-
tain the lotty sublimity of God. OUr know-
ledge - .. intelloctual e. S \7e11 as our phan-
tasms -- are far short ot' God's utter super ... 
ex.ce11ence; love, and love alg!l9, is able 
to un! ta us vl1 th the d.i vine.5 
Thus for Dlonys ius the third way in t he line of kno\,. 
ledge of l:1tUl leads to th~ sllpore1~lnont, t:::-anscondont. di'vine 
nature of God. For him thero Is s. (.2.cfinltc pro£l'o,:sion that 
;~VtJl>y bair1t; 13 e.. cood. Therefore, we sc..y 
that the cause of it is the GOQU; next we 
.lony thut the caUfJO is ;, 110 Goo<.1,; t;ut this 
ndgation becorr.es in ltf) turn an affh'mation, 
.ro.;.'" if Jod is not tpsc Good, 1 t is Lecause 
He 1s the Supel"good • .?( 
Thus in the language of Dlonysius" God as the cause ot' 






"COT:UUC transcendant" i1 est innommabte, Ie grand 'Anonyme t ; 
, ••• Mais lea noms que nOlla donnons a. Dieu n f Ill'!'i vent JD..."'ll!lls 
a 10. hcuteur de 1a tru.ruihcndance di "vine; no~ conna.lsiJances 
,-- 1es intel1ectue11e.3 Souse! b1en que les im&gina.tlves __ 
cchouent devant la suracellonce de Dieu; saul lfal~ur est 
capa.ble ~e nous unir au di vin.« 'l'h6ry, 93. 
UChaquo etro oct un bien; noua J.il"'ons donc quo ea cause est 
Ie Bien; puis nous nierons qu t elle solt Ie Dien; mais cette 
nesation deviendra a son tour uno nfflI'rnat':'on, car" a1 l)1eu. 
n1e::::c pas 16 .olen, c'e~t quHl t';st l'llyper:':'ien." ,:ilson, 32. 
!Ie wou.ld/6 said Lo not only tb0 Good bu:1; evon the Supor-
Good. 
CHAPTER IV 
A COMPARATIVE STODr OF PLATO'S 
SUPRElm GOOD AND DIOlfYSIUS' 
GOOD GOD 
It someone were to take up a portr-al t ot a friend 
painted when he was about five years old and compar-e it with a 
portrait drawn thirty years later, he might find striking re. 
semblances between the reature. or the two. No one would say that 
the two portra1ts are identioalll tha fHllme. The sleam in the 
eye, the aqu1line nO.8, the little twisted &'11i1e on the cheeks 
-. all the.e might atill be there on the portrait of t he mature 
man. But yet thay would not be the 8tUle. The older teatut'e8 
would resem.ble the '1outhrul features, but their proportion would 
be much greater. 80th pictures would Pl"Otrt17 one and. the same 
man but at dirterent stases or hi. ltt •• 
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A 81milar comparison can be made bet •• en the philo-
.ophy or Plato -- the portrait ot a youthful ph1losophy ... and 
the more mature and more completely developed philosophy of DiO%l7~ 
.tus _. the portl"ait ot a matupe phIlosoph,.. Rven though thtlre 
i8 a :resemblance, a marked s1r.rl.larl ty, between the two men, still 
they are not identioal. Whereas Plato sugGested or poInted to a 
possible .olution or merely hlnted at an Idea, DlonT81u8 oerti-
fled, drove on to a 10gloal conolusion, and explained his ideas 
as much .s he was fbIe. Tho portral t ot the 70uth and the por-
tx-ait or the man show marked resemblanoe.. But m&llr changes 
bad taken place trom the t 1me tha t Plato started hi. career to 
the time that DlonysIu8 completed his work. The thought of 
Plato had passed through the minds ot many great thlnkel's" and. 
as a result had become much more p:roJ.'ule and more developed than 
when Plato had expressed his 1deal tor t be .first time. Yet de. 
spite this trenwndoUB change end despite th.e f act the D1on"s1u8 
was 80 greatly influenced by tho followers of Plato, the Neo-
platon1st", the resfJmblance 1s nonetheless there. However, it 
must be remer..'lbered that tho moro mature thinker, D1orqslu8, had 
at his: hand th$ t ru1ts ot many great mind. that had added 1n 
lome instance. clarity and depth to the thought of their master, 
Plato, and in other instances, obscurIty and superficialIty. 
First ot sll, we can aee til marked stmllarity between 
the I tages ot knowledge or :?lato and the motions of the soul in 
--------------------........ 
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Dl011yslus. In both these 18 de1'"1nlte scale starting w1th sense 
percoption and concludlnE with t°he knowledge of the ultlnllite 
pr1nciple, the Good. 'lato divide. the lower division ot his 
, I , 
11ne Into two parts __ ~I.K"'(f"Lct. and7T,cn:,s. The rOl'm$l:" stage J!le-
ters to the "shadows and t hen reflections in water and on sur-
taoe. ot dense, smooth, and br1ght texture, and everythlng of 
that kind."l The latter rorers to t he "animals about us and all 
plants and the whole calss of Obj~Ct8 made by nan.tt2 The co:r-
responding .tage 1n the system ot Dlonysius 1.8 t he movement of 
the aoul ",~l1ree,~e." This one movement InDIol1ysiu8 t plan in-
cludes the two lowest stae,as ot Plato's 80ale. Dlonyslul suma 
up the two lowest stages of Plato by usIng .the general phrase 
I 
and "'''1:,S 1n one motion or ths a Qui. 
Dlroecte vero mO'\f'.tur, quando non ad att-
lpsum lngred1tur, neque alntulax-1 motu 
eplrltall rOl·tur, IS ad ad ea quae ips! 
v10tna aunt progred1tar, at a rebus ox-
tern!8, non secus so signis qu1buadam 
varlla ac lIlUltip1101bus. (J..".;' rwv 3 
» .d~' :t. I , I.l l ) 
,f Iw u,fy w"'"~P e(TJD 'r'vwv (/'1IJ.( IvD/tW~ 
aecause or tilts 'JIlthea1a, the second mot1on ot the 
80ul to%' DloDJ81u8 corresponds to t he third atage ... J, ~ vo'col." 
ot Plato •• divLded lin.. Dionyslu8 calls this motion an 
... £ q'l • $' , .1. 
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"oblique" motion ot the $ oui. In this stage tor nato the IS oui 
mu.t "1nve.tlgate b7 treating a8 1mages the things 1mitated 1n 
the tormer dlvl.10n~ and b7 means of usumpt10ns fl'Om whlah it 
prooeeds not up to • first prinoiple but down to a oonelu81on. n4 
The movement or the soul 11 the lame tor D1oD,.81ua, "Ob11que varo 
c1etl..1l'- animua, quando pro captu auo notlonlbua dl vini. 11iu.tr ...... 
tur, DOll apiritali qu1d_ un1to modo, .ed cog1tando et d1aclU"l"en-
do quaal perm.lst18 tluxiaque actlon1bu .... $ F1nal11. the highest 
st~ge ot Plato brings the soul to the knowledge of the highest 
pr1nciple. 
It advances trom ita usumptions to a 
beg1nnlna or prinoiple thattrDnacends 
a8stmaptlon, and in wbtch 1t maluus no us. 
of the lmaa.' emplOJed~ the other sect1on, 
re171ng on 148a8 only . progressing s,...tem.-
aticall,. t hrougb ideas. 
DioD,,81ua, on the other hand, expands and. explains 
the highest movement ot the soul a little more tull.,_ 
Anim1 autem JIOtua orbicularis eat e jus 
ab ext~anel. 1n aemet1peum lntro1tu., 
.plr1tall~e lps1ua tacultatum untmoda 
1nt'lexio, quae quae1 11'1 C 1roulo t1xum et 
ab omn1 errore l1berum motum .1 trlbuit, 
et a mult1. rebus extrane1, lpSU8 con-
vert1t ae coll1g1t pr~ a4 .e, delndef 
qua.i jaa unlua modi etfectu., conjunct4a 
uno modo tacultat1bua, conjunglt, atque . 
ita demua ad pulohrum ac bonum manuduolt, 
quad 8upt'a omnia quae 8unt et unum ftt idem, 
.!t a1ne principio et s1ne fine est;f 
Hence tor both philosophers the f blal stt1ljJ ot cognition leads 
to a unity, a princ1plo ot being by which evel'ythlne; else 1s 
unified. POl" botb men tbe tinal .tage consists of a simple grasp 
and an intuition of' an llmlaterlal nature which 18 intelligible 
1n 1taelr. Despite the tact that for Plato the object of th1s 
intu1t1on 18 the ideas, whioh a:N) dlstlnct from the soul, while 
for Dlonyslus the object 18 tho.oul It.aU and 1 ts own powers, 
still both philosophers ultltUltely- terminate in tho intuition 
at the prinolple at unity, the 1dea ot goodness. 
But befoFe the comparison 01' tht. first pr1nciple 1n 
the works or the two men 18 made, a word must be said about the 
atage of knowledge that 18 Just below the flnal stage. It has 
been shown that between t he sphere ot aeneat10n and t he ultimate 
sphere ot knowledge, Plato puts an intermediate, the sphere of 
ideas. In these ideas the beings ot the lower atagea partic1-
pate in greater or less degree. Although a tew oommentators 
interpret Plato as Ineaning that thesa ideas have ex1stence onl,. 
1n the mind conceiving them, the muoh more common interpretat1on. 
and the one that follow. the m.ost ouv10ua 8ense of the text, i. 
that they have rotil existence independent of tho mind. In an,. 
case this much 1s certain. Plato explains the perfections in 
the lower stageo by meal18 of tho ideas. Of this wo are certain 
whethex' the tdeas exist Qutei\le the mInd <,'11' not. 
An anal)"sl. of' Dlonyalua ahows thst he holds a very 
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.tmila~ doet~1ne ot ldeaa.8 Between the hl~~o8t princIple, the 
t l~st caua. ot all things, and t ho part! culars which are round 
in the lowest stage ot baiopa, Dlon.,81u8 places the universal 
Idea. a& forms. "Q.uaerti& autem quid pro~sua dicamua pert .8 es •• , 
aut POl' 8e v1t~ aut quaecunque absolute at principallter .8S8, 
at ex Oeo ac primo creata 688e ponimua."9 ne Rnawera the que .. 
t1cm. by _:ring that thoa€) 1doas Including the idea ot boms ~ 
p~edlcat&d o£ tho first cause in 80 .fal" aa t hey also partici-
pate in the t lrst oause. Juat as all partioulars are partici-
pations ot the first caus., 80 a180 are the Ideas participatIons 
or It, Hence the Good, which 18 the fIrst cause, i8 the author 
ot these 1deas and ot all particular being. a8 nll. "Quamobl' •• 
bonu. ille et ipsorum quae prima aunt auctor esse d1cItur, de-
1nde GOrum quae generatim et un1verse ll1a part1cipant, postea 
sorum quae in parte."lO Thull the 1deas are the first and the 
h1ghest part1cipations of the Good. "The DI0ft781an torms are 
• I ~, 
the verY' f1rst beings, T .. 7rfunw~ ~".A, the very f'lrtst to rece1ve 
6xistence. which the,. pOa$EHUJ in this wa7 ""l'wrUJ),~1To>'VzUJS /(a~ 
~f).~ y ,/(~:, ."11 
• _. • aOI •••• u,. 
L 
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Yet for D1onys1us-there 1s no quest10n of the real 
existence of the 1deas. Where Plato 1s obscure and open to such 
an 1nterpretation as 80 many commentators have ot his fantastic 
conceptions, Dionysius is much more definite and more easily 
comprehens1b1e, He ridicules those mlO would make gods or cre-
ators of these ideas, as so many ot th~ ancient philosophers had 
done even before the time of Plato, and himself insists that they 
do not exist; "quippe Ctl.Dl non essent."12 
In this treatment ot the ideas can be recognized the 
doctrine ot the divine ideas. With Dionysius these ideas are 
like the l1nes radiat1ng fro:11 the c enter of a c1rcle. Just 
as the lines are unified by the point in the center, 80 are the 
1deas unified by the source trom which they come. The Good 1s 
the center trom which radiate the many lines which are compared 
to the ideas. 
Et est ex ipsa at in ipaa ipsum per se 
esse, et rerum principia, et omnia quae-
cunque sunt, at quae quomodocunque 8unt} 
idque incomprehense, at copulate, et singu-
lariter ••• Et in centro omnes lineae circuli 
una copulatione airJul e.xistunt; at punctum 
habet omnes reetaa lineae uniformiter copulatae 
inter se, et cum uno principio a quo exi~runt, 
at in ipso centro omnino copulatas sunt. I ) 
But this must be remembered in the consideration of t his compari-
son. The ideas as compared to the radiations from their center, 
-
12 De D1v1n1s Nom1n1bu~; XI, 6. 
13 V; 5. 
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the Good, are really distinguished from that oenter and are also 
subordinate to it because all depends on the position and the 
existence of that center. Thus all ideas depend on and exist 
because of the existence of the Good. "The ldeas, then, repre-
sent so many dl vine rays, hardly separated .from their center, 
although they are already quite distinct from it."l4 In hls 
treatment ot the ideas, therefore, DlonysluB, so it seems, has 
taken a position midway between an exaggerated interpretation ot 
the Platonic ideas -- the interpretation whichw ould ma.l{e the 
ideas entities that are really eXisting outside the mind of the 
one conceiving them -- and the position ot Saints Augustine, 
Bonaventure, and Thomas which identifies the divine ideas, which 
are the exemplary forms tor all things whether actual or possible 
with God.15 
The final stage of cognition for both Plato and Dion}". 
sius leatis to the knowledi;.e ot the first principle ot all things. 
For t he one it is the Supreme Good and tor t he other the Good 
God.16 Aetne first principle and bef.;inn:t.ne:; it 1s the cause ot: 
all t hinge; this both philosophers teach very clearly. Yet once 
, L I I , ~ ~L.s 1dees representent done autant de rayons divine, a pe1ne 
el01gn~s de leur centre, mala qui sten dlstinguent pourtant 
d'J~." G1lson, 84. 
15 fibid., 8). 
16 ereatter, wben the good refers to the ultimate principle in 
the philosophy ot both men, the word will be written 'Vlth e. 
capital letter. 
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again the paucity of words on this point andwnnt of clearness 
of expression ~n the part of Plato is in marked contrast to the 
superabundance of worda and clarity of explanation by Dionysius. 
Plato vex'Y simply states the fact that the Supreme Good is the 
cause of all thlngs.17 In the first instance of such a stater.1ent 
he ll1akes a comparison ot the causality of' the Supreme Good with 
that of the sun: 
.... the Sun 1s not Vision, but it is the 
cause of vision and also is seen by the 
vision it causes. It was the Sun, then, 
that I meant when I spoke of that offspring 
which t he Good has created in the visible 
world. to stand there in the same relation 
to vision and visible things as that that 
the Good itself bears in the intelligible 
world to1sntelllgence and to intelligible Objects. 
In the analogy Plato seems to have obscurad the nature of' the 
causality of the Supreme Good. Once again be says that the 
Supreme Good is the cause not onl~ of the knowledge of things 
but also of their very essence and existence. flThe Objects ot 
knowledge not only receive their being known from the presence 
of the Good, but their very existence end essence 113 deri ved from 
17 Republ1c, 5160. 
18 RepuBlIc, 5a8a. The translation of this sect10n 1s from 
~rancls Cornford, The Re~UbliC of Plato, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2w. lioreY'strans!ation of the clause 
L 
" :>.n ' ~ , :> , \ C ..... 1 "hi h th ~" -r--<'Y4l4DOV I.yl.vv"r~l' .tVA,,/IO!OV ~.vr't' s Wl c e 
good begot to btand in a proportion with itself." The trans-
lator has missed the "analogy" in order to preserve the Greek 
\'1101·<1 order. 
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it to them. t119 Finally, he again makes the comparison with the 
sun. "Once it is perceived (the Supreme Good), the conclusion 
must follow that, .cor ::.111 things, this is the caUSE) of whatever 
is ri£ht and cood; in the visible world it gives birth to light 
and to the lord of liGht, whileit is itself sovereicn in the in-
telligible world and the parent of intelligence and truth. H20 
Plato, then, mer'ely keeps arfirI!linS that the Supreme Good is 
the cause of all things -.71-.fI'''",fI' ~lr,o" ... - without sayinr- tl.uch 
more. 
When Dionysius explalnsthe causality of the Good --
and he does it quite frequently -- he penetrates to the problem 
a little more t horoughl,._ He does not merely say that the Good 
1s the cause of all things "'-7T.("r~" ""r~LO"-- but that it 1s the 
c " efficient cause .. - W!» .".",,,rc.l(ofl' -<',Lelf -- as well as the cause of 
the motion of all things. Here he uses tho expressions K'fI'o'U" 
Besides, it is the final oause of all things c ... - wS 
\ ' n r ~t,,'KOV' ",,,nov -- and the exemplary cause as well .- TTc,,,,, Oe.'!4t/.-
r'Kov .21- Dionysiu3 is quite emphatiC about the causality of the 
Good; he repeats tho idea over and over again. Not only that, 




20 ReEub1ic, $17C. This passage is also taken from Cornford. 
<Snce again Shorey fo11ow~ the strict Greek word ollder and 
21 ~s5fvrgtsfi~i!nf£u~~eI\~0¥~t. 
••• at cuncta in Ipsum Intuantur, at ab 
1pso movantur at conservantur, at ipsius 
gratia at propter ipsum at in ipso omne' 
prinCipluz exemplare, r1nale, afflciens, 
formale, materiale, et don1que omne prin-
elplum, omnls conservatio, omnis finis, at, 
ut summatlm dicam, omnia quae aunt, ex pul-
chro at bono exsistunt, et o:r.rnia quae non 
aunt in pu1ehroet bono sunt, suparsubstan-
ji&.l,1 tar; at est omnium pr1nc1pium (rr.(v'Cc.AJV' 
«p~n) supraquam pr~~clpale et finis 
supraquam perreetus. 




but more specifically it is the cause of all good 
things just as thoroughly as it is not the cause of evil things. 
Jam vero pro modulo nostro satis laudatum 
est bonum, in quantum vera admlrandum, ut 
principium at finis olr'.nium, ut reru..l'l'1 omnium 
complexus, ut formana res non exsistentes, 
ut causa bonorum omnium (~~ 7T'.(Y;;WlI itX..{ 6):;:'", 
«~/r,ov ), ut nullius mall cauaa (~S"CW V I'(CI<i:JlI 
~v~:r'ov ), ut providentia at bonltss ab. 
soluta, quaequJlt omnia, tam quae aunt quam. non 
sunt, superat.~ 
The reason why Dionysius introduces this idee. of the Good as s. 
non-cause (~v.~~,~v) is that the negation or the negative side 
of the causality exercised by the Good and its very natu.re as a 
cause superior to all its effects is t he basia of the ll!. Ne~~­
tionis. In other words, a further insight into the n&.ture of the 




IV, .35 .. 
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terior be1ngs, the effects of the Good. 
The exercise of the causul1ty of the Supreme Good In 
the works of Plato 1s such that "the objects of knowledee not 
only recl'~lve from the presence of the Good their being l(nown, 
( • ' ? ,. but their very existence and essence ,/(4' r4t t,., "'A' ,t K-'-( ~ nv 
~~rf~v) 1s derived to them from It."2S Even if it is Eranted 
that in the Platonic concept of being the notion of existence is 
not used to mean the exercised act of existence for a reel being 
but rather the mere intelligibilIty which saves the beine' in be-
oomin£: from non-being,26 still the Suprem& Good exer::!ises com-
plete and ultimate causality. From ell indications neither Plato 
nor, for that matter, any of the Greeks, ar1"1 ,~ed at the cor:.cept 
of existence as an. exorcised act, as did the le.tar Christian 
ph1losopheJ's .2.7 
Dianys ius uses a terrninology identical with the. t of 
Plato. He says the. t "dum 111a.:m appetunt .. tam ut slnt qu.am ut 
>. obtinent, nec non illl 
quantum fas est, conformantur. n28 Then again he becomes more 
effusive.. "Ex eo qu,i est, aevu ... rn, et substantia, at existentia, 







aI son, The 5sirlt of Mediaeval Philosoph:, ScribLer's ~ons, 
New York;-t9I' , 4.31:- ' See Gilson, ffBeing and Its Necasei ty," ill.2.., 42-6,3. 
De Divln1s Nomln1bus. IV, 1. V; 4. . 
L 
12 
tew examples ot a theme Dlonyslus ~epeat8 constantly; the whole 
ot the fifth chapter in a disoussion of the natura and partioi-
pation of being in the Good is on t.his topio. Though Dlonysius 
does use the terminology of Plato, and even thoueh the 10""1ca,1 
conclusion with regard to the notion of existence shoulc t·c;~he 
same as the conolusion of the earlier Greek philosopher, still 
he did not himself draw such a. conclusion. ~11 th the aid of the 
Christian backgr-ound that wLsh1s, he WDS able to see t he nec-
essity of some interpretation of the Platonic and Neoplatonic 
ideas. A more thorough study of his notion of being wo~ld have 
to be made be.f'ore the conclusion could be drawn that he has lnade 
the same mistake as was made by Plato. To go into a thorough 
atud7 of being would take us into considerations of contingency, 
analogy, and participation, allot which would take us too rar 
afield ot our present interest. 
However, a few ideas a bout Plato' 5 and D1cnysius t con-
cept of being will help in our understandinr of the1r idea. of 
the Good. ~.i'or these philosopher's the notion of bolnS certainly 
does not mean thB oI'dination of an essence to an existence. Such 
a doc'trino leads to tho conslusion oJ: a Being in whom essence is 
identified with ex.:l.s(.;e~~eJ such a being is Crod. l,"ior both Plato 
~d Dionysius all di£ferences in the notion of being lay outside 
the notion o.l' being. Therel'oJ:'e, t he notion of non-ens, which 
:rami!' les from the not.ion of the GOou., takes on the meanir!b ot' a 
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potential ena. The notion of being takes on the meaning of the 
amount of p~rticlpatlon of a creature in being. Pure being, 
that is complete being, ls not, then, identified with God, for 
pure being does not carry the notion of full exi~tence. Since 
being is limited in some respect by n9n-being, something of 
greater extension must stand above both ot them. This isfue Good 
which ramifies into being and non-being. 
Even though both Plato and Dlonysius maintain that 
trom the Good comes being, they also hold that the Good is not 
belng. Plato insists that "the Good is not the same thing aa 
being, n30 even though it gives being to all things. Dionysius, 
on the other hand, says almost the same thing when he shows that 
being is predicated ot God in the sense t hat He is t he cause of 
all being and t hat, therefore, being 1s rather the first parti-
cipation of God, and thus God gets the name of being through 
participation. God i8 being in the sense that all being is pre-
contained in His nature and through Him all things receive their 
belng.31 God t hen is pre-Being in the sense that He is the cause 
at all being. 
Neither philosopher stops at this negatt va side of the 
na tUre of the Good. Both ot them go on to show the. t the Good, 
30 Republic, 509B. 
31 De 15IVInis Nominibus. v,5. 
_ ................... --
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even though it is not being strict1,. speaking, has a naturte that 
transcends all being and thus lies beyond t he range of human in-
telligibility. Plato expr'esses this idea when he explains t he v 
natur0 of the Good: "The Good 1s not the sarno thing as being but 
even beyond ooin:::." surpass in, it in dignity and power. ".32 To 
express the tr&lscendent nature of the Supreme Good, Plato uses 
the Greek word Dionysius uses the very same word in 
expressing the transcendent nature of t he Good God: "BlL'l1ma omnium 
(~7T..(~ruJv) ejus quae supra omnia (4-;r~KE'VCl(. 77 • ./vrwv) est t ot1us 
proprietatis identitas."33 Thus by its very nature the Good 
transcends all things, stands above being in the sense that it 
gives being to all t hinga, and tra.nscends even non-being, which 
strives for it as for an end. 
When Plato once again ment10ns the Supreme Good, he 
speaks ot 1t as a principle or "beginning that transcends as .. 
, , ~ ,) I ~ 34 
sumptions (41 -'f,xnv ~y"1TD O'frov)~ The id~a that Plato seems 
to be trying to get across is that the nature ot t he Supreme Gooct" 
is 80 very Tal' above tr.l6 t hinge cognized by the human mind t:1at 
the mind cannot really attain to tr~e knowledge of it. Once 
again be hints at this inabi11ty of the human mind. "In the re ... 
32 Republic, 509B. 
33) De b!v!nls Nominibu8, II, 4. 
4. !fe"putl!c, 5trsa. ' 
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glon or the known the lu t thing to be seen and hardly to be seen 
(,Il.;!'~ o,;'r9<lL) is the idea of' the oood."35 Plato is hinting .. t 
the tact that even though the mind Jo~s come to the first prin-
ciple of all things, t he nature of t bat .fIrst prInciple so tI'ans-
conds all knowledge that only a. ve:.'] little can be known atout it. 
As always, D10ny-sius expresses the very same idea with 
8uperlati va fT ce. The princ iple or beginning of all things is 
for him not only the naturethat tranacends assumption, but it 1s 
the auperessential, superoriginal principle ot all things: "Omnia 
principii Buperessentialiter superorlginale prinoiplum (itpxn~ 
" C , c' ") .36 Th f i "'--
_71"'''''5 lJ"t.p"aN"'UJ~ lJTrE.f"'fX'OS .f X 1fJ" .... 8 act s tuu.t DioIl7-
slue so otten mentions the "absolute no-thing which is above 
reality" and the " all .. transc ending hiddenneas of the all-tra.ns-
cending supereasant,lally supaI'existing super-Diety, "37 that one 
begins to suspect that either agnosticism or scepticis!l should 
be the logical result 01 his insistence. So strong and persist-
ant isthe idea of the transcendence, ineffability, and incom-
prehens1tl1ity of the Good God tr~t "one should not say anything 
nor even think anything about God. ".38 
~5 517B. 30 De Di~ln18 Naminibus, I, 3. ~7 -rnge, Il~. 'II 
~8 "Il ne taut rlen dire, ne moms rion penser de D1eu," X. Le 
Bachlet "Dieu, Sa Nature dfapren les P~re8," Dlctlonna,1.re 
de TheoloSie catholltue, ed. by A. VaC8.11t.et E. Mangenot, mra1~!'e !:eto"uzey e 'Xne, Paris, 1933, IV, eol. 111.:3. 
Another point should be mentioned here while the idea 
ot t he transcendent nature of the Good is being discussed. As 
shown, Dionysius first ot all admits that the perfections found 
in creatures can be predicated ot God, Then he comes right back 
and denies that such a predication can be made because of the 
transcendent nature of the Good Godlotl{ o~"itov KlI":WS lh,[f ."39 
Though at first sight the argument seems to be a vicious circle 
and a contradiction, it has to be interpreted as Dionysiu8 meant 
it to be, The basis of the distinction is the idea of analogy 
between t he perfections found in creatures and t he perfections 
of God. The s1milar1 ty of the analogy is the t oundation of the 
way of affirmation; the dissimilarity is the way of negation. 
In truth, there is only an apparent eon .... 
tradiction since the terms do not have 
exactly t he same essential meaning in the 
way of affirmation as in the way of nega-
-tion. God 1s not a living being like those 
we know through our experience, and yet He 
is living in another way. Transcendent to 
the categories in which we call all beings, 
He is not, however, completely alien to 
them, tor their perfection comes from Him. 




De Di vim. Nomin1bU8, IV, 1. 
4 "'En' realite', it niy a contrad.iotion qu t en apparence, parce 
que les termes n'ont pas exactement 1e mSme sens dans l'ar-
firmation at dans 1a negation. Dieu nt.st pas un ~tre 
vivant comma ceux que nous connaissons par experience ,t~ 
pourtant~ 11 est vivant autr~ment. Transcendant aux cate-
gories ou nous c;assons les etres, i1 ne leur est pourtant 
pas tout a fait etranger, car leur perfection vient de lui. 
11 leur ressamble et 11 ne leur ressemble pas." Arnou, 
col. 2374. 
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Dionysius insists as much on the negative way as on 
the affirmative way because for him the negative way means that 
in God there must be a superabundance of being, 11fe, intellig-
ence and so of all the other perfections found in creatures. 
For Dionysius t he negative way is the negation of impertection.41 
It is because of the negative way that the human mind finally. 
comes to the highest and most perfeot way ot the knowled~e of 
Ood. the way of excellenoe already :mentioned, c haracterlzed by 
" 
> , .. 
the use of the word 1J7TI!,f." Yet, in spite of all his enthu-
siastic expression, Diollysius has opened the door to an agnostic 
interpretation of his philosophy_ 
, I 
The term. t1JTr£P' so characteristic or 
the language of Dlonyslus indicates 
that absolute transcendence thnt makes 
ot God the great unknown -- as ScotU8 says, 
'The Ur~owablet -- but not, entirely in-
accessible; for indeed love penei)rates 
right into those regions which are impen-
etrable to reason and the intelligence; 
and it is due to the very fact that God is 
transcendent to all realities which can be-
come the objects of QUI' human intel11gence, 
that in speaking or Him our negations will 
be more correct than our aff1rmations. 
Nonetheless, in this event our negative con-
cepts do not indicate in God the absence of 
being or ot goodness ••• This not1on of the 
negative theology, based on the principle 
ot the transcendence of God, 1s preemin-
ently a vital thought ••• but it is, none-
theless, dangerous in its termlnology and 
4.1 Q! Di v~nls nomini bus, IV, 3. 
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in its proximity to agnosticlsm.42 
Although Dionyslus' seeming agnosticism can be explain-
ed in a way that frees him of such a charge, another difficulty 
can be proposed which is a bit more difficult to get around. 
Earlier in this atudy it was shown that Plato compared the over -
flow of the Good upon all things to the radiation of the sun upon 
a.l1 visible creetures.4.J How such a comparison, which is 80 
characteristic of the Platonists and the Neoplatonists, 1s un-
fortunate for D1onysius. \f.hen Dionysius uses it. he adds a noto 
that Plato does not himsel.f add when he makes the ve!'Y same com-
parison. Dlonyslus says this: 
43 
Quemadmodum en1m sol ille noster non 
cogitatione aut voluntate, sed eo ipso 
quod est, iliuminat wllversa quae quoqqo 
modo lucia ejuB sunt capacia; sic etiam 
;, I I 
"La terme 11"£:"{' si characteristique de la langue dion'1s1enne, 
indique cetta absolue transeendance qui fait de Dieu Ie grand 
inconnu -- Scot d1t: l'lnconnaifsable -- mais non toutefo18 
ttinacc6ssibleJ,car ltamour p~netre dans des regions ferm' •• 
a la raison et a I'intelligence, et clest parce que Dieu est 
transcendant a toutes les r~aIitJs qui peuvent taire I'objet 
de nos connaissances humaines, quten parlant de Lui nos nlga-
tiona seront plus j~stes que nos affirmations} ma18 dans ce 
cas nos conscepts negatirs, ne voudront pas signitier en 
Dieu ;tabsence d'~tr. ou de bont~ , •• Cette concept1on de 
la theologie n~gative, fond4e sur le principe de 1& trans-
cendance de D1eu, est par excellence un concept vital, ••• 
lnais dangereuse cependant dans ses expressions et par son 
vois1nage avec ltagnostlcisme." Thery, 105-106. 
R~publ,lp, .s08:s ... C. 
ipsUDl bonum ipsamet substantia sua, rebus 
omnibus. pro cujusque eaptuI"totius boni-
tatis auas radios afrundit.~ 
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This very comparison has been the souroe of much con-
troversy over the doctrine of Dionysius. If he means that God 
pours out His goodness upon things just as the sun pours out its 
light "non cogitations aut volu:r,tate," then there is S81"'ious 
question ot t he liberty ot God. Now Dion7sius may have been in-
terested in only one part of the comparison and did not realize 
all its consequ~nce8. As much can be suspected when the phrase 
"non cigitatione aut voluntate" 1s seen. Perhaps he meuns the 
"non cogitatione aut voluntate" to reter totbe sun and not be 
carried over with t he comparison to mean t hat the Good "non cogi-
tations aut voluntate" pours out its goodness on creatures. The 
example may be just another case of Dionysius' superlative lan-
guage that has given grounds for such misinterpretation. But it 
by this expression Dionysius really means to say that the Good 
God "without reason or will" pours out His goodness, than it seems 
that God would be necessitated in sharinG lIis goodness with crea-
tures. It would follow, then that the Good God is forced Ly Ilis 
very nature, sinee His nature is goodness itself, to follow the 
law that goodness must reproduce itself. If that 1s w}~t D1ony-
sius means, then God must of necess1ty pour His goodness on crea-
tures. "The danger was to enter into the spirit of the primitive 
44 De Di vln18 Nom.1n1 bus. $08B-C. 
-
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thesis even to the point of denying the liberty of God and of 
making the creation of t he VI arld a necessary radiation o£ the 
divine and sovereign pert'ection.n45 It does not seem, in the 
light of the Christian background of Dionysius, that he wou!d 
admit limitation in the Good God even though he leaves himself 
open to such an interpretatlo~.46 
From what has been sald so far, it is very evident 
that both Plato and Dionyslus hold the prim~cy ot the Good in 
their metaphysical systems. Because of the goodness of this 
first principle and because ot the fact that it ls good by its 
very nature, all belngs are what they are. "It is from the very 
f " be) -r , , act that He .. ~S goodness 1 His essenCe,c.&I5 4>zJf"UldI.S _1'«,9."'" that 
at all times lIe by His very llatuI'o po~s out lIis goodness upon 
45 I "Le danger atait drentrer dans l'esprlt de 1& formula pru.-
ltlve jusqufa nler 10. liberte divine et a faire de 1& pro-
duction de mende un rayonnement necessaire de la sover-
.1ne perfection.- Arnou. col. 2361. 
It is important to remember that this is but one small pass-
age from out ot.' an entire treatise. If· this question is judged in the light of the entire treatise, Dion1sius1 or-
thodoxy on t he question is established. "S. Dionysium non 
voluisse excluders a Deo electionem Simpliciter, ac 8i Deus 
non libere sed necessario res creatns produxlsset, sed el-
ectionem secundum quid, in quantum scilicet non tantum qui-
busdam creatur1s bom.itatem suam communicat, sed omnibus, 
prout scilicet alectio dlscretlona quamdam importat; nam 
a11oquiD, ut'lbldem bene probnt D. Thomas, Deus, CUll sit 
pr~ agens, per lntelleotum at voluntatem cuncta causare 
dicendue est." Corderius, 158. 
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all oreatures."47 In spite of the tact that both hold to the 
primacy of t he Good, t hey do not seem to see in it any grounds 
or limitation.~ Yet .• God must be perfection, its fulfillment, 
and complete realization, God must be infinite perfection. 
To insist on the primacy of the Good -- as both Plato 
and Dionysius do -- means the insistence on the idea of a per-
fection wbich implies limitation in God. For it God is ~ood. 
first and foremost and before He is being, w hat in the Good is 
the object of Godls desire tn the creation of beings Which parti-
cipate in His goodness? Obviously, if goodness is in the pri-
macy, there would be no reason wi thin itself to communicate its 
goodness to others. The object of Godts desire, similarly, would 
be outside Himself. (tod, t hen, would not create freely. However, 
suoh limitations would not be in God if Being is the first and in 
the prtmacy, for l~ing is at once both aot and the cood -- act 
defines the intrinsic nature ot' God and good defines the objeot 
ot His desire. God as Being has, therefore, within Hir:lselt a 
reason for the exercise ot IUs causal power. God as goodness 
would have a reason outside Himself. 
Then again, if the Good is t he ultimate reason for all 
47 REt c'est pare. qutil est 1a bonte par essence,~~ O~.l~SfS 
1t,-.lJ6%, qu'11 lui appartient de repandre Ie. bonta' sur tous 
Ies etres." La Bach1et, col. 1125. 
things, what explains the nature of the Good itaelt? If' it 1s 
Supreme Goodness, lt must have perfeotion of itself and not re-
ceived perfection. Otherwise it would bo llmited by the per-
fection from which it receives perfection. Now existence is a 
perfection. Whs. t, t ben, explains the existence of t he Supreme 
Good if Being is but the first participation of the Good? Is 
existence, then, something completely foreign to the notion of 
Being? Pla-co does not answer these questions; the supreme Good 
tor him tranacands all assumptions and that 1s all we know about 
ita nature. lor does Dlonysius answer this que.tion. Instead, 
he finds refuge in quoting Scripture and thus relies on authorit7 
for his argument. "Penetrated through and through with Platonism. 
as he was, this Christian never rose above the idea. of the pri-
macy of the Good, never' grasped the primacy of Be1nr,.tt48 Since 
Dionysius discusses this idea as frequently as he does, we can 
be almost sure that he did not see in it the grounds for limita ... 
tion of God. 
Since this idea of the "beyondness," of the transcen-
dence" of the Good, i8 80 very fundamental to tbose two philo-
sophers, the traditional use of non-being has to be modified. 
As has been shown; the Good lies beyond being, yet it is the 
48 Gilson,!ll! Spirit 2! Mediaeval !hiloscphl, 93. 
8,3 
source ot.' being. It 1s onl,. natural to asle: 1n ,.That way the Good 
dUral's trom being. In other words, what enters into the notion 
of the Good to distinguish it fram being? The ditference that 
arises t rom. the Good and being must also have its ultimate source 
and end in the Good, or else the Good is not the final principle. 
Now, the only thing opposed to true being is non-being. And if 
non-being is the difference that e xiats between the Good and 
being, then non-beine has a nature aa well as being. Therefore, 
non.being cannot mean nothingness; rather it must have the mean-
ing ot "otherness," and thus would not tall within the concept, 
of being. Non-being must have a very definite sense, For both 
Plat;o and tor Dionysius non"",be1ng must be something having 
"~an1ng and substance."49 
The similarities between Plato's Supreme Good and 
Dionysius 1 Good God are many and str'lklng, as this study has 
brought out. Yet in the light ot the discussion can the con-
clusion be drawn that Plato really meant the Supreme Good to be 
the vert same I'Gal1ty that Dionysiu8 calls his Good God? The 
resemblance seems so striking that such a conclusion seems quite 
tenable. Although the eminent Platonic scholar, ProteasoI' Tay-
lor wrltes:"The transcendent source ot all reality and intel-
49 St~~zel: 110. (The author, obviously, does not use the word 
substance in the philosophical sense of ~ub~tance as opposed 
to accident. He uses it 1"'1er01), &.s Ii S'11l0nya fOr" the word 




ligibi11ty of everything other than itself corresponds to the 
!E! realissimum of later philosophy and its GOd,"50 is he not. 
with a knowledge of philosophical history 1n his favor, reading 
his own mind into the pages of Platots philosophy? Profo~sor 
Hardie treads a b 1t more s oftl,. 1n the hallowed sanc'tuary of 
the Supreme Good when he writes: ul should like to say that it 
(the Supralne Good) may nevertheless be fairly thought of as 'the 
god recognized in Platonic philosophy. ,,,,51 A slightly different 
interpretation is gi van by Stenzel: "Although we have no right 
to identify the idea of the Good in t.he ~eE.up11c with t he God or 
the Timaeus, some blend of religious elements with his philo-
sophy was essentia.l to Plato in working out the vievi of the Idea 
,..., 
as transcending experience.""'" It may be true that for the con- Ii 
venience of the Plato scholars, this un1tlcation of ideas, so 
easily made, may oe a clarification ot their ideas, but to con-
clude that such was the mind or Plato is not licit. Everyone can 
see the~m1lari17 between the Supreme Good of the Republic,53 the 
Beaut,. of the SlFPos1um which is "eternal, Wlproduced, and in-
destructible,"54 and the ·z~ ~)'".IJ;,," ot the ,Phaedo,wh1ch 1s a 
!bertain abstract beauty and goodness and magnitude_ uS5 But 1t i8 
50 Taylor, 289. 
51 W.F.R. Hardie. A Studl of Plato, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
1936, 1;;6. - - -
52 Stenze1,·45. 
5..3 Re,eu,.)11c, ';;09n. . 
54 tJenJii1In Jowett, The' pia10~ues 2! r.1a,t.'!' Charles Scribner· s 
Sons .. 'liew York, 10'9'9', 2XO: 12. 
55 ~., 100B. 
I 
altogether another thine to say that Plato himsolf sav, nnd acknow-
ledged this siL:lilarlty or intended to identify these similar 
principles. 
Another student ot Platonism takes a different view 
ot the question; he does not seem to want to commit himself. 
"On the whole we may say that the question as to the x-elation in 
Plato's mind between God and the Ideas, especially the Idea ot 
the GOod, cannot be answered because the Platonic writings do not 
supply materials for judging~ ,,56 FinallY: in Shorey' s oPinlon~ 
the pane of the scale tip to the very oppoeite position from that 
which they had for Taylor. "God and the Good, then, 8l"'e associ-
ated ideas that may seem to be identified 1~ the language or 
poetry and mystic devt)tion. But the stat.ement that the idea of 
the Good i8 God is meaningless.uS7 
What then should be said finally abont the Supreme 
Good of Plato? The finest definite expression on this topic 
seems to be the conclusion of Gilson; his. words seem to be the 
most logical conclusion to ell the facts pointed out in the 
study of Plato·s Supreme Good. The force of his words ~ld the 
def1nitene88 of his decision show the determination of his con-
56 
57 
James Frazer, ~~c Growthot Plato's Ideal TheoEI, Uacnll1an 
and Co., London, 19jO,!o~ '," '" 
Paul 3norel! '{.hat Plato Said, University of Chicago Prens. 
Chicago, 19j,:3', ~l. -
86 
elusion. "Assuredly, nothinc mn'e closely l"'(~Ser:lblc!J f.:,ho d cfinl-
tion of tho Chrlntian God than thls definition of the Good. Yet, 
when all is said, the fact ::-'omains t hat Plato himself has :never 
called the Good a God.n58 
Finally, one added point must be stressed lest th:ts 
study of DionysiuB sive riso to a constant misconception o~ his 
philosophy. In this study th£ similarities between Plato and 
Diony-eius have been brOfJ.Bht into the limelight. Yet, t}'e number 
of dissimilarities 1s legion and also very remarkable. Greatest 
of all is the tact t hat Plato was a pagan, Dionysius a Christian. 
And t hat makes all the intnense difference in the world. When 
Dlonysius speaks of love, union with God, praysl", and spiritual 
light, he is speaking of realities Plato never dreamed of. When 
he speaks of God, he has t he revelation of t he New Testament to 
help him to rea11ze who God is. Plato had only the ftndings ot 
the ear11er Greek philosopbers who were still cha.ined down to 
the tangible things of t his earth. So even 'though the similar-
~ 1tles are what t hey are, the dissimilarities keep the two men 
, 
apart in thought as much as t he eight centuries oi' t 1me keep them 
apart in the pages of.' our history booka. 
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